


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
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Threats to US Security in a Postcontainment World

DAVID E. ALBRIGHT

THE FUTURE OF THE AIR FORCE

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by

DAVID E. ALBRIGHT

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
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Foreword

The stunning changes in the complexion of international politics that began late in the decade of the 1980s and continue today will profoundly affect the American military establishment as a whole, and the US Air Force in particular. Decisions about the future course of the military will be made in the early part of the 1990s which will essentially determine the course of the US Air Force well into the next century. Decisions of such importance require thoughtful consideration of all points of view.

This report is one in a special series of CADRE Papers which address many of the issues that decision makers must consider when undertaking such momentous decisions. The list of subjects addressed in this special series is by no means exhaustive, and the treatment of each subject is certainly not definitive. However, the Papers do treat topics of considerable importance to the future of the US Air Force, treat them with care and originality, and provide valuable insights.

We believe this special series of CADRE Papers can be of considerable value to policymakers at all levels as they plan for the US Air Force and its role in the so-called postcontainment environment.



DENNIS M. DREW, Col, USAF
Director
Airpower Research Institute

About the Author



Dr David E. Albright

Dr David E. Albright is currently Air University professor of national security affairs and senior research fellow at the Airpower Research Institute, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Before joining the Airpower Research Institute, he worked as a research associate and editor at the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), as an editor at the journal *Problems of Communism*, and as professor of national security affairs at the Air War College. Dr Albright has published extensively in the general area of international security affairs. The most recent of his six books and monographs is *Vanguard Parties and Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Soviet Perspectives and Their Implications* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1990). He has also contributed more than 30 chapters and articles to edited volumes and to such diverse journals as *In Depth*, *World Politics*, *Pacific Community*, *Problems of Communism*, *Europa Archiv*, *Parameters*, *Soviet Studies*, *CSIS Africa Notes*, and *International Affairs Bulletin* (Johannesburg). Dr Albright has traveled widely abroad. His overseas trips have included three lecture tours under the auspices of the United States Information Agency.

Executive Summary

The US must take into account the nature of the threats confronting it in devising its military strategy and force structure. Recent years, however, have brought significant changes in these threats. Therefore, the threats need to be reassessed and reprioritized, and the implications of the outcome for US military strategy and force structure should be examined.

In carrying out the reassessment and reprioritization of threats, it is essential to observe two key principles: (1) emphasis should go to direct challenges to US interests rather than to those of a peripheral concern, and (2) threats should be weighted primarily in terms of the probability that they will actually materialize and not in terms of what havoc they would wreak if they did materialize.

On the basis of these criteria, four major threats seem likely to face the US in the coming years. In descending order of importance, they are regional conflicts, Soviet strategic nuclear forces, anti-US terrorism, and Soviet conventional military forces.

This configuration of challenges establishes a number of requirements for future US military strategy and force structure. Although it does not afford detailed guidelines for either, it does set broad parameters for both. A few of these requirements merely revalidate aspects of past strategy and force structure, but many dictate new approaches.

Chapter 1

Introduction

THE national military strategy and military force structure of any state should flow out of, or be tailored to, the threats that it faces to its security and the priorities that it attaches to these threats. Since the late 1980s, however, the threats confronting the US have been undergoing major change.

The most dramatic of these shifts has been in the nature of the Soviet challenge. Old style Communist rule has collapsed throughout Eastern Europe, and the Warsaw Pact has disbanded.¹ The Soviet Union has unilaterally withdrawn substantial numbers of its troops and weapons from Eastern Europe and has agreed to pull all of its forces out of the region by the end of 1994.² The Soviet leadership, even fairly skeptical observers concede, has reduced its overall military spending and production as well as the size of its conventional forces. In the wake of the involvement of many top Soviet military officers in the abortive coup of August 1991, moreover, the new Soviet minister of defense, Lt Gen (now Marshal) Yevgeni I. Shaposhnikov, has announced that 80 percent of the senior officer corps will be replaced, and the Soviet military as a whole seems to be in substantial disarray.³ Although these developments have not totally eliminated the capacity of the Soviet Union to launch an attack on members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the developments have made initiating such an attack more difficult, and they have substantially lengthened the warning time available to NATO that an attack might be in the offing.⁴

Outside Europe, the Soviet Union has adopted a new attitude toward regional conflicts. Instead of attempting to fan such conflicts for anti-Western purposes, the Soviet Union has moved toward cooperation with the US to resolve, or at minimum to temper, these conflicts. By mid-1991, collaboration of this sort between the two superpowers had yielded significant fruit. Free elections had taken place in Nicaragua, and the Sandinista government had turned over power to former opposition elements. Namibia had achieved independence, Cuban troops had withdrawn from Angola, and the government and the rebels in Angola had agreed to a cease-fire and the holding of multiparty elections. An effort had begun under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) to win acceptance by the various factions in Kampuchea of a plan for elections in that country. The UN Security Council had condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and had authorized the use of force to bring about Iraq's withdrawal.⁵

New realities such as these modifications in Soviet policy suggest the need for a systematic reassessment of the threats that the US will face to its security in the years ahead. They highlight in particular the desirability of reordering the threats in a coherent manner.

Underlying Perspectives

IN approaching the subject of threats to US security, this paper focuses on threats which have at least a military component or for which military power has some

relevance. It is important to recognize that these will not constitute all of the security threats with which the US will probably have to deal. For example, economic as well as military threats will almost certainly exist. These could include such things as the possibility of the world breaking up into competing economic blocs—a development which would have seriously adverse effects on US economic well-being.

Indeed, the weight of military threats in the overall array of security challenges to the US will in all likelihood decline in the years ahead. The reductions in the Soviet military threat that have already taken place or seem to loom on the horizon will greatly lower the general level of military challenges, for the Soviet threat has long had a dominant influence on US assessments of military challenges to US security. At the same time, the increased economic interdependence of the US and the rest of the world is heightening the potential impact of economic threats on the US. This trend will no doubt persist, and it could well intensify.

The growing significance of economic challenges may even compel the US to revise its concept of vital interests. In the past, it has defined a *vital interest* as one sufficiently important to justify going to war to protect.⁶ Yet military instruments do not represent adequate means for coping with economic threats. To be sure, these instruments are not totally irrelevant to economic challenges. Military forces can be used, for instance, to protect sea-lanes for trade and to assure access to key natural resources. But, basically, military power has only limited applicability to economic concerns.

Nevertheless, the purpose of this paper is to lay out in a prioritized fashion those threats critical for shaping military strategy and force structure. In this light,

concentration on challenges with a clear military dimension to them appears appropriate.

To arrive at a prioritization of security threats, this paper applies two criteria. First, it evaluates threats with an emphasis on the probability that they will materialize, rather than on how catastrophic the results might be if they did materialize. Despite the willingness of the US to accept a high level of spending to carry out Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in early 1991, in the future it will probably cut back severely on the resources that it devotes to handling military challenges.⁷ In such a context, a worst-case analysis has little merit. It would tend to downplay the threats that the US might have to address through actual combat, and it would tend to stress those threats least likely to reach this stage.

Dismissing the seriousness of outcomes for the US as a factor in ranking threats, however, would go too far. Indeed, such a course might guarantee that improbable threats turned into harsh realities. Therefore, in rating threats, this paper accords weight to the gravity of the impact on the US if strife truly emerged from them, but it treats this consideration as a subsidiary one.

Second, this paper assesses challenges in terms of the degree to which they will directly affect US interests. If the US operates in the 1990s and beyond under conditions of fiscal austerity as already suggested, it cannot afford to treat just any sort of potential conflict or the outbreak of conflict just anywhere as a threat. The US must channel its attention toward conflicts that really matter, and not become distracted by conflicts of peripheral concern. Otherwise, the US will dissipate its energies and resources and risk succumbing to a major challenge.

Organization of the Study

ON THE basis of these criteria, this paper identifies four major security challenges that the US will probably face in the years ahead and orders them according to their likely severity. These challenges are regional conflicts, Soviet strategic nuclear forces, anti-US terrorism, and Soviet conventional military forces. Chapters 2 through 5 go into these threats individually.

The treatments of the four threats follow a common pattern. Each begins with a discussion of where the threat will probably fall in the overall ranking of challenges and why. Then it explores the precise nature of the threat.

A final chapter highlights the key implications for US military strategy and force structure of the likely challenges to US security examined in the preceding pages. These implications derive from both the relative weight and character of the threats identified.

Notes

1. The member states dissolved the Warsaw Pact's military structure at the end of March 1991, and on 1 July 1991 they agreed to abolish the organization entirely. Such a step requires ratification of the agreement by each country's parliament, a process expected to take less than six months. See Steven Greenhouse, "Death Knell Rings for Warsaw Pact," *New York Times*, 2 July 1991.

2. This commitment by the Soviet Union to remove its forces from Eastern Europe has come for the most part through bilateral accords with individual East European countries. In the case of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), however, it was incorporated into the German reunification treaty signed by the US, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the GDR on 12 September 1990. See "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany," *US Department of State Dispatch* 1, no. 6 (8 October 1990): 164-67.

3. On Soviet military cutbacks, see Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1990), chaps. 3 and 4; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's, Autumn 1990), 30-33. Regarding Shaposhnikov's announcement and the general state of the Soviet military post-August 1991, see Michael Dobbs, "Soviet Military Chiefs Ousted," *Washington Post*, 26 August 1991; Fred Hiatt, "Soviet Military Seeks New Focus Amid Uncertainty," *Washington Post*, 1 September 1991.

4. *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 16-17 and 96-97; the Department of Defense plan for US military strategy in the 1990s approved by President George Bush in August 1990, as detailed in Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan," *New York Times*, 2 August 1990; George Bush, "United

States Defenses: Reshaping Our Forces," speech delivered at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990, in *Vital Speeches of the Day* 41, no. 2 (1 September 1990): 676-79; and Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Besieged," *New York Times*, 5 September 1991.

5. For official US acknowledgment of the Soviet Union's contributions to the achievement of these results, see Secretary of State James Baker, "From Points to Pathways of Mutual Advantage: Next Steps in Soviet-American Relations," address to the American Committee on US-Soviet Relations, Washington, D.C., 19 October 1990, in *US Department of State Dispatch* 1, no. 8 (22 October 1990): 199-203 and especially 200.

6. This notion of vital interests has long permeated American thinking about national security affairs. For a good illustration, see Donald E. Nuechterlein, "National Interests and National Strategy: The Need for Priority," in *Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader*, ed. Terry L. Heys (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), 42. Nuechterlein, then professor of international affairs at the Federal Executive Institute, had served on the senior staff of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Moreover, his paper was presented at the Ninth National Security Affairs Conference, cosponsored by the National Defense University and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

7. See Michael R. Gordon, "Despite War, Pentagon Plans Big Cuts," *New York Times*, 3 February 1991; Walter S. Mossberg, "Even the Scaled-Down Military Machine Planned for '95 Would Leave the US a Still-Potent Force," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 March 1991.

Chapter 2

Regional Conflicts

AT THE top of the list of threats to US security interests into the twenty-first century will stand regional conflicts. Such conflicts represent the challenges most likely to arise, and although no single conflict will probably affect US security interests in a devastatingly adverse way, even one could have a major negative impact. Several conflicts at once would undoubtedly create serious security problems for the US. Not all regional conflicts, of course, will qualify as threats to US security, but a significant proportion of them will do so.

This ranking for regional conflicts reflects a combination of factors.

Increase of Regional Conflicts

FIRST, there has been a considerable proliferation of regional conflicts since the 1960s; they now represent the principal form of strife in the world and are likely to retain that distinction in the years ahead.¹ Such a prospect results from some key changes in the global environment.

A far more complicated diffusion of power has taken place than President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger envisioned in the early 1970s. They believed that the bipolar world dominated by the US and the Soviet Union was giving way to a world with five major poles—the US, the Soviet Union, China, a unified Western Europe, and Japan.² Yet over the intervening years a fairly large group of states

with capabilities too limited to exert much influence in the global arena generally have nonetheless assumed significant roles in regional contexts. This group includes such diverse entities as India, Brazil, South Africa, Iraq, and the Republic of Korea. Thus, regional balances of power today involve an expanded set of key actors, and the key actors themselves vary from region to region.

Moreover, with the growing inclination of both the US and the Soviet Union since the early 1980s to refrain from even indirect military confrontation with each other in regional contexts, many other states feel less inhibited than they did previously about engaging in military undertakings. Because of the reduced risk of having to take on a superpower, these states calculate that they might be able to redress their grievances against a government or another state by military means. Such thinking appeals particularly to the newly prominent regional actors, but it is by no means confined to them. Some small states and even opposition elements within a variety of countries exhibit it as well.

Of no less consequence, the potential for insurgencies has increased greatly since the mid-1970s. Western colonial rule, to be sure, has essentially vanished as an issue, for virtually all of the former Western colonies have now achieved sovereignty. But—ironically in an age of growing economic interdependence—ethnic/religious nationalism has been on the rise in many places, and this trend has led to demands by numerous

ethnic/religious groups for independence. Even the Soviet Union has not been immune to such a development; in fact, holding that country's various ethnic/religious groups together in a single entity now rivals improvement of the Soviet economy as the most critical task facing Moscow. Furthermore, as ethnic/religious tensions have heightened throughout the world, so too has the inclination of ethnic/religious minorities to resort to insurrection to achieve their desired end of sovereignty. The Sikhs in India and the Tamils in Sri Lanka afford good illustrations. As a result, the emergence of guerrilla warfare against at least most governments perceived to be oppressive by ethnic/religious groups must be considered a real possibility.

It should be stressed, however, that the line between domestic conflict and state conflict is also becoming increasingly blurred. Ethnic and religious minorities in one state often have affinities with the rulers of neighboring states, and these common bonds have persuaded the rulers of an expanding number of countries to provide arms or some form of assistance to insurgents in other states. Newly important regional actors have been especially willing to engage in such activities. For instance, Pakistan in the 1990s has been supporting the Muslim rebels in Kashmir whom India has been trying to suppress.

Enhanced Firepower of Many Participants

SECOND, no longer are the industrialized states of the world the sole possessors of large stocks of modern conventional weapons and equipment; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons have also spread substantially and seem destined to continue to do so. By the late 1980s, 19 developing

countries qualified as highly militarized. That is, they had managed to acquire sophisticated aircraft, armored vehicles, missiles, and often ships, through arms imports and/or domestic production. The 19 were Angola, Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, Taiwan, and Thailand.³

At the beginning of the 1990s, the number of states that openly admitted having nuclear weapons remained the same as it had been since the mid-1960s—five. Aside from the US and the Soviet Union, there were Great Britain, France, and China. But four other countries—India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa—were said to be *de facto* nuclear weapons states. Four additional countries—Iraq, Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Algeria—were thought to have launched or probably to have launched nuclear weapons programs. Still another two—Libya and Taiwan—had in the past undertaken initiatives designed to provide them with nuclear weapons.⁴

Other than the US and the Soviet Union, only two countries—Iraq and Iran—were known to possess chemical weapons in the late 1980s. However, another 19 states were suspected of having or attempting to obtain such weapons, and an additional nine were being closely monitored for indications that they were trying to acquire weapons of this type. The first group included Bulgaria, Burma, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Laos, Libya, Romania, South Africa, Syria, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. In the second group

were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand.⁵

By early 1991, according to a US Navy intelligence report, 14 countries outside the Soviet Union and NATO "probably" possessed chemical weapons. This list included Burma, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Four other states, among them Saudi Arabia, were thought possibly to have such weapons, and another 10 countries were believed to be seeking them.⁶

Various US officials, among them William H. Webster, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, claimed in the late 1980s that at least 10 countries aside from the US had or were seeking to produce biological weapons. No enumeration of the group was provided on the grounds that compiling the list had involved secret intelligence sources, but the Soviet Union, Iraq, and Iran evidently appeared on this list. A later US Navy intelligence analysis indicated that it included Syria as well.⁷

Many of the new and would-be possessors of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons have deployed or are in the process of obtaining advanced means for possible delivery of such weapons. At the beginning of the 1990s, 11 countries—China, Egypt, France, Iran, Iraq, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria—had ballistic missiles in the field. Only China, France, and Israel, it is true, could unquestionably put nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads on these missiles. Moreover, just China, France, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, and Syria built their own missiles; the rest of the

countries relied on purchases from abroad for their missile stocks. Nevertheless, five of the six in the latter group (Syria was the lone exception) had known development programs for military missiles. The same held true for Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, and South Africa.⁸

Characteristics of New Military Powers

THIRD, many of the states that have acquired or pursued additional firepower for their arsenals, particularly those in the third world, display some common characteristics pertinent to their likely behavior in the years ahead. They have engaged in military combat at some juncture in the last 10–15 years, and at the moment they find themselves locked in regional power struggles with other countries in the group. Perhaps most important, they share a conviction that military power affords status and influence in the international arena.⁹

Direct Threats to US Security

FINALLY, US security is or would be affected directly and adversely in some manner by a substantial number of existing or potential regional conflicts.

Current Threats

Six regional conflicts under way at present pose security challenges to the US. They are:

1. **Persian Gulf.** Iraq's seizure of Kuwait and its other efforts in August 1990 to pressure Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab states in the Gulf to increase the price of oil represented an attempt by Saddam Hussein to establish Iraq as the dominant power in the region.

Had he succeeded in this endeavor, the present governments of these countries might have toppled, and the US, Western Europe, and Japan might have found their long-term access to the oil of the area impeded. Such considerations, as well as the desire to shape the post-cold war world order, underlay the US decisions to dispatch troops to the Gulf in August 1990 and to resort to force to expel Iraq from Kuwait in January 1991.

The subsequent defeat of Saddam Hussein's forces by the US and its coalition partners in late February 1991 has greatly diminished the Iraqi threat. Not only did Iraq lose most of its facilities for producing chemical and biological weapons and nuclear material during the course of the allied bombing campaign, but its conventional forces suffered heavy losses of men and equipment during the air war and the brief ground campaign that followed. Indeed, Saddam Hussein himself has faced overt opposition to his rule since the conclusion of the war.

Nevertheless, the sources of strife in the Gulf and US concern about them have by no means vanished with Iraq's military defeat. As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, Iraq might try to defy its conquerors and eventually resume its efforts to expand its influence in the region. To do so, Saddam Hussein might well revive his Islamic populist appeals in an attempt to eliminate a US presence from the region and to oust the Gulf monarchies that now oppose him. His machinations to preserve the Iraqi nuclear assets that the bombing of the country did not destroy lend additional weight to this possibility.¹⁰

Not all post-Hussein regimes in Iraq, however, would inevitably ensure regional tranquillity. A government dominated by Shia Muslim fundamentalists, for instance, might ally with Iran and attempt to bring down the Gulf monarchies and exclude the US from the

area. A weak government unacceptable to the country's Kurds might unleash a drive to forge a Kurdish state out of the Kurdish-inhabited portions of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Neither of these possible alternatives appears likely at the moment in view of the success of Saddam Hussein's efforts at suppressing Shiite and Kurdish rebellions after his withdrawal from Kuwait, but given the flux in Iraq, it would be imprudent to rule them out.

Furthermore, Iraq does not constitute the only potential threat in the region to the US and the Gulf monarchies. Iran could once again assume a menacing stance. Although the Tehran government rejected Saddam Hussein's attempt in January 1991 to draw Iran into a holy war against the US and its Arab allies, Iran has nonetheless made plain its opposition to a US military presence in the region. Iraq's emergence in a weakened condition from its confrontation with the US could embolden Iran to renew its efforts to claim the leading role in the Gulf, and it might seek to accomplish this goal by showing that it could stand up effectively to the US and the Gulf monarchies. Such a possibility is enhanced by the fact that the "moderates" in Tehran, who have virtually abandoned Iran's anti-US and anti-Arab militancy in the 1990s, have not yet fully consolidated their hold on power.¹¹ A resurgence of the "radicals" is not wholly out of the question. Awareness of this reality has helped to persuade the Arab monarchies of the Gulf to propose the conclusion of a security pact with Iran.¹²

2. Eastern Mediterranean. The decades-old conflict between Israel and the Arabs (Palestinians and most Arab states) continues, and this conflict impinges on US security interests in complex ways. On the one hand, Israel is a long-time US ally; moreover, because Israel qualifies as one of the major military powers in the Middle East, close ties with

it help to ensure that the region does not come under the domination of an anti-US coalition. This relationship does not entail US military bases on Israeli soil or even regular US access to Israeli military facilities. But it does tend to transform threats to Israeli security into threats to US security.¹³

In the early 1990s, the most serious threat to Israel has come from Iraq. After the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988, Saddam Hussein sought to assert leadership of the Arab world by mobilizing it against Israel. He also endeavored to strengthen Iraq's hand militarily with respect to Israel. Not only did Hussein retain the huge armed forces that he had built up during the war, but he persisted in turning out chemical weapons, moved to produce biological weapons, and worked on developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. When the US launched a military attack in January 1991 to drive Iraq from Kuwait, Hussein fired missiles at Israeli cities, hoping to draw Israel into the fray, rally all Arabs to his cause, and split the Western-Arab coalition arrayed against him.

Iraq's military defeat in early 1991 by the coalition of countries headed by the US has greatly eased this particular threat. Yet other threats of a less imposing character persist. Perhaps the most serious of these comes from Syria, which continues to possess fairly significant military assets and has been endeavoring to enhance these assets since the end of the 1991 Gulf war.¹⁴

On the other hand, the US wants to remain on friendly terms with as many of the Arab countries as possible. Their goodwill, especially that of the oil producers, goes a long way toward guaranteeing a continuing flow of oil from the Middle East to the US, Western Europe, and Japan.

Yet association with Israel strains US relations with all of the Arab countries

because of continued Israeli occupation of territories that belonged to Arab states prior to 1967, and because of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. Tensions have increased since the late 1980s, when the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza launched an *intifada*, or uprising, against Israeli control of these lands. Israel has not managed to come up with political proposals that would end the rebellion or to quell it militarily.

Developments during the 1991 Persian Gulf war may temporarily ease the difficulties confronting the US in this regard. The Palestine Liberation Organization supported Saddam Hussein, while Israel showed great restraint in the face of Iraq's Scud missile attacks on Israeli cities. This contrast in behavior made a strong impression on Arab members of the anti-Iraq coalition such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, by late July 1991 it had helped to persuade Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to agree to attend a regional peace conference which would pave the way for direct negotiations with Israel.¹⁵ Nevertheless, US ties with Israel will probably continue to complicate US dealings with the Arab states as long as the territorial and Palestinian issues are unresolved.

3. Korean Peninsula. Korea remains divided, and an attack by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Republic of Korea not only would put a longtime ally of the US in danger but could also cause major instability in Japan, the biggest US trading partner in Asia and its key ally there. Although the Pyongyang government in 1991 reluctantly dropped its opposition to the seating of both Koreas in the United Nations, there is little evidence that North Korean President Kim Il Sung or his potential successors have given up the dream of uniting the peninsula under their aegis. In fact, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea seems to be working assiduously to build up and modernize its military

forces; it even appears to be trying to acquire nuclear weapons.¹⁶

The Soviet Union's decision in September 1990 to establish formal relations with the Republic of Korea may have reduced the chances of adventurism by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for even though the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has a domestic arms industry of real consequence, the country is still dependent on imports from the Soviet Union for its most advanced weapons and equipment.¹⁷ However, this Soviet step by no means precludes a future resort to force by the Pyongyang government. Indeed, the greater the diplomatic success of the Republic of Korea in undermining the claim of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to represent the whole of the Korean Peninsula, the more tempted the Pyongyang government may be to adopt military measures to bolster its position.

4. Thailand-Cambodia Area. Vietnam withdrew its military forces from Cambodia in 1989, but the Khmer government that it left in authority has had difficulty in coping with the heightened military activities of the Khmer Rouge. The intensified fighting could spill over into Thailand, an ally of the US for many years. It could eventually involve Thailand in full-scale hostilities.

The accord concluded in September 1990 by the four warring political factions of Cambodia—the followers of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front of Son Sann; as well as the Phnom Penh government and the Khmer Rouge—does offer some hope that such an outcome can be averted. This agreement committed the four groups to a framework for a comprehensive peace that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council had drafted. According to this plan, a new Supreme National Council would be set up with six representatives of the govern-

ment and two from each of the three opposition factions, but it would cede much of its authority to the UN. Some 5,000 UN peacekeeping troops and 1,200 UN officials would then run the country, organize a cease-fire and nationwide elections, disarm the combatants, and ensure that all foreign forces had departed and all foreign military aid had ceased.¹⁸

Yet not until June 1991 did the four parties to the accord formally commit themselves to a cease-fire and to stop receiving foreign arms, and they were still accusing one another of violations of the cease-fire in mid-1991.¹⁹ Such foot-dragging leaves open to serious question the ultimate implementation of the agreement.

5. Philippines. Circumstances here have relevance to the US on two counts. One is the local facilities that US military forces have used in the past and to which they will evidently retain access at least a while longer. In September 1991, the Philippines senate rejected an agreement reached by the governments of the US and the Philippines in July 1991 which would have allowed the US to continue to maintain forces, although reduced in size, at the naval base at Subic Bay until 2001, but it now seems probable that any US withdrawal from the Subic Bay facilities will take place over two to seven years. Moreover, the new senate that will emerge from the general elections scheduled for 1992 might prove more amenable to an agreement than the present senate has. Prior to the beginning of eruptions by Mount Pinatubo in June 1991, it looked as if the US might keep some presence at Clark Air Base as well; however, an Air Force survey team found that this facility was too severely damaged by the volcanic eruptions to be rehabilitated.²⁰ The second consideration has to do with the special relationship between the two states. The Philippines has long been a US ally, and because it is a former US colony, it will in

all likelihood remain an ally—regardless of the fate of the bases or the extent of the US military presence in the country.

The present government in the Philippines faces challenges not only from domestic communist insurgents but also from military elements aligned with civilians prominent under the old Ferdinand Marcos regime. If Corazon Aquino's successor as president is also at odds with the two groups, he or she, like Aquino, will confront the demanding task of fending off both of their threats. Should a neo-Marcoist government come to power, it will probably have to cope with an intensified communist insurrection.

6. The Andean States. In the 1990s, drug cartels operating out of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia supply the bulk of the cocaine that enters the US. Portions of Peru and Bolivia serve as the main coca producing areas, while Colombia is the site of most of the processing laboratories.²¹

The governments of these three countries are, to varying degrees, engaged in military struggles with the local drug cartels, for the cartels often have private "armies" that carry out kidnappings and other terrorist activities to intimidate law enforcement officials. All of the governments also face insurgencies led by radical political groups, and these groups sometimes act in concert—perhaps even in outright collusion—with the drug cartels. Guerrilla organizations such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru have attempted to advance their causes by making themselves the protectors of coca producing peasants against government agencies trying to stop the growing of coca.²²

Potential Threats

Identifying all of the regional conflicts with a reasonable probability of developing in the years ahead and with direct

implications for US security is difficult, for future events impossible to foresee at this juncture might lengthen the list. Nonetheless, the following clearly qualify for inclusion:

1. Balkans. As a result of the political ferment in the region since 1989, instability has increased enormously in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Reformist communist elements of varying stripes now exercise dominant influence in Bulgaria, Romania, and even Albania, although in Bulgaria and Albania they operate in governmental coalitions with other forces. But the new regimes confront political opposition from both old-line communist bureaucrats and different types of noncommunist groups. Moreover, the economic situations in all three states have gone from bad to worse, with little prospect for significant improvement in the near term. In Yugoslavia, the two most economically advanced republics, Slovenia and Croatia, have come under the rule of defectors from the former Yugoslav Communist party, while Serbia, the most populous republic, has confirmed in authority officials of the renamed Communist party. This split has exacerbated the struggle among the country's six republics and two autonomous provinces over the state's future shape. In this struggle, both Slovenia and Croatia have declared their independence, although they hold out the possibility of eventual association with other republics on a confederal basis; Serbia has endeavored to preserve and dominate the old federal structures or at least to annex all territory in the country with a majority Serbian population. The Yugoslav military high command, composed largely of Serbian officers who belong to the revamped Communist party, has at times employed force on its own authority to prevent any weakening of the federation. To top things off, the Yugoslav economy is now in shambles because of the failure of

Yugoslav socialism and the political maneuvering by the republics and autonomous provinces.²³

This instability could lead to sustained armed conflicts of a diverse nature, and some of these could wind up involving NATO allies of the US—especially Turkey, but Greece and Italy as well. For instance, Bulgaria has a substantial Turkish minority, and during the last stage of the Zhivkov era in the late 1980s, this minority suffered severe oppression, with the consequence that a flood of refugees entered Turkey. This situation evoked an official complaint from Turkey. Although the current Bulgarian government has adopted a more liberal policy toward the Turkish minority, some non-communist political groups and most Bulgarians seem to favor a repressive approach toward it.²⁴ If a Sofia government pursued such a course, and particularly if it sought to expel Turks, it could well provoke a confrontation with Turkey.

Significant numbers of individuals of Greek extraction live in Albania, and their lot has been hard over the years. Therefore, when the Tirana government eased the country's border controls at the beginning of 1991, many fled to Greece. The Greek government, convinced that Albanian officials were encouraging the exodus to get rid of some opposition elements before the state's first multiparty elections took place later in the year, lodged a formal protest, for the new arrivals severely taxed its limited resources for handling refugees. Eventually, the Tirana authorities said that they would readmit without punishment any Albanian citizens who wished to return.²⁵ Were Albania to renege on this promise or to continue to press the Greek minority to depart, tensions between the two countries might rise to new heights and lead to military encounters.

Other, perhaps less probable, scenarios can be envisioned too. Greece

might become engaged in military clashes with Bulgaria or Yugoslavia over the old territorial question of Macedonia and/or over treatment of Macedonians in Greece, Bulgaria, or Yugoslavia. Italy might do the same with Yugoslavia (more properly, Slovenia and Croatia) over old boundary claims along the Adriatic coast and the Istria Peninsula and/or over the Italian minority in Yugoslavia.

2. Transcaucasia and Turkey. The Transcaucasian republics of the Soviet Union—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—have now asserted their sovereignty, and it is possible that some or all of them might become independent of the Soviet Union in the not too distant future. Such a development might well produce considerable instability and even armed strife in the area. Not only are there strong political and social cleavages within these republics, but the republics themselves have major quarrels with each other. For example, Azerbaijan contains an enclave of Armenians who would like to become part of Armenia, and since the late 1980s the Armenian republic has agitated openly for transfer of this enclave to its control or at least self rule for the area.

If violence became the norm in the region, Turkey, a key US ally because of its position at the junction of southern Europe and the northern tier of the Middle East, could face serious threats. Armenia, for instance, has an old grudge against Turkey for the alleged massacre of Armenians by Turks during and after World War I, and Armenian antipathy toward Turkey has been heightened in the 1990s by Ankara's efforts, since central authority has attenuated in the Soviet Union, to build links with Azerbaijan, now Armenia's arch foe.

3. Turkey-Syria-Iraq. Turkey, a US ally, participated in the embargo against Iraq after Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990, and it even allowed US planes to fly missions against

Iraqi targets after the onset of the Persian Gulf war in January 1991. These actions could ultimately result in an armed confrontation between Turkey and Iraq, regardless of the nature of the government in Baghdad. Whoever holds the reins of authority in Iraq in the future will probably not soon forget Turkey's behavior and could decide to redress this grievance by a resort to arms in some fashion.

Furthermore, another situation has been emerging since the 1980s that could lead to military clashes between Turkey, on the one hand, and Iraq and/or Syria, on the other. Turkey has been constructing a huge system of dams in the eastern part of its territory, and this system, when in full operation, will have the capacity to interrupt the flow of a large portion of the water supply upon which both Iraq and Syria depend. Turkey, in fact, has already staged a brief demonstration of the capabilities that it will enjoy.²⁶ It is an open question as to how long Iraq and Syria will be willing to tolerate this state of affairs.

4. North Africa. In 1991 Saddam Hussein's battle with the US-led coalition seeking to free Kuwait generated widespread pro-Iraqi responses from militant Islamic elements throughout the region. These responses underline the growing possibilities for a struggle between such elements and the elements currently in control of local governments. Both the Algerian and Tunisian governments, for example, have recently begun to face serious challenges of this nature, and the Egyptian government has done so for a number of years.²⁷

If such a struggle were to take military form, the outcome could be highly ad-

verse for the West in general. The conflict could impede Western commercial and military operations in the Mediterranean Sea, and it could spill over into the Muslim minorities of US allies along the northern Mediterranean littoral, thereby disrupting the domestic order of these states.

Basic Nature of the Challenges

THE diffuse origins of the threats enumerated above render generalization about them difficult. To a large extent, each situation will entail unique features. Yet three observations of a broad character are worth making.

Although all of these conflicts have direct implications for US security, the kind of challenges that they pose to US security interests is far from uniform. Some threaten the well-being of the US homeland and US citizens there. Others threaten US access to military bases or facilities overseas or the welfare of US citizens abroad. Others threaten the security of countries allied with the US on the basis of some common security concerns. And still others threaten to disrupt regional balances of power in ways deleterious to the US.

The conflicts do not cover the entire globe by any means. They are concentrated in two general areas: (1) the Mediterranean littoral and the Middle East, and (2) East and Southeast Asia.

Although some of these conflicts involve insurgencies, almost none of them is exclusively an insurgency. Indeed, few are even primarily domestic in nature; most have key state-to-state dimensions.

Notes

1. Frank Carlucci, *Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1989* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 4.

2. The most explicit statement of this perspective may be found in an interview with President Nixon. See Hedley Donovan and Henry Grunwald,

"An Interview with the President; 'The Jury Is Out,'" *Time*, 3 January 1972, 15. However, many of Kissinger's public commentaries during the period contained vague references to the outlook. See, for instance, "The Nature of the National Dialogue," address to the Pacem in Terris III Conference, in Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 3d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1977), 127-29. The perspective was also implicit in the diplomacy that the two conducted during these years.

3. In 1985-89, 78 percent of the major conventional weapons transferred to developing states went to 15 countries. These included Angola, Afghanistan, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Taiwan, and Thailand. See Ian Anthony and Herbert Wulf, "The Trade in Major Conventional Weapons," *SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1990), 227-28. As of the mid-1980s, 10 developing states had demonstrated an across-the-board capability to turn out military aircraft, armored vehicles, missiles, naval vessels, and small arms and ammunition. Among these were six that imported major conventional weapons in 1985-89—Egypt, India, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan. The other four states were Argentina, Brazil, China, and South Africa. See Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, "Arms Production in the Third World: An Overview," and appendix 2, "Register of Indigenous and Licensed Production of Major Conventional Weapons in Third World Countries, 1950-84," in *Arms Production in the Third World*, ed. Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson (London: Taylor and Francis for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1986), 16 and 305-49.

4. Leonard R. Spector with the assistance of Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: 1989-1990* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), chap. 1; "China Helps Algeria Build First Arab Atom Bomb," *Sunday Times* (London), 28 April 1991; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Algeria to Allow Eventual Inspection of Reactor, Envoy Says," *Washington Post*, 2 May 1991; Don Oberdorfer, "Roh Seeks Curbs on N. Korea: Nuclear Arms Research Cited," *Washington Post*, 4 June 1991.

5. Giovanni A. Snidle, "United States Efforts in Curbing Chemical Weapons Proliferation," in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, October 1990), 21. Snidle was at the time a foreign affairs specialist with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency responsible for issues related to chemical nonproliferation and conventional arms transfers.

6. Statement by Adm Thomas A. Brooks, director of naval intelligence, to the House Armed Services Committee in March 1991, as reported in Michael Wines, "Navy Report Asserts Many Nations Seek or Have Poison Gas," *New York Times*, 10 March 1991.

7. See "Statement of the Honorable William H. Webster, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency," in Senate, Committee on Government Affairs, *Hearings: Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Challenges and Responses*, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 9 February 1989, 1; H. A. Holmes, statement before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on 17 May 1989, "Biological Weapons Proliferation," *Department of State Bulletin* 89, no. 2148 (July 1989): 43-45; S. J. Lundin, "Chemical and Biological Warfare Developments in 1989," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1990*, 129-31; Adm Brooks's statement to the House Armed Services Committee in March 1991, as reported in Wines.

8. Snidle, 21-22; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's, Autumn 1990), passim; Martin Navias, *Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World*, Adelphi Papers 252 (London: Brassey's, Summer 1990); Janne Nolan et al., *Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles: Policy Options for the Future* (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, Program on Science, Arms Control, and National Security, 1990); "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Developing World," in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, June 1989), 17-20; Spector with Smith, chap. 3; Kathleen C. Bally, "Can Missile Proliferation Be Reversed?" *Orbis* 35, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 5-14; Bill Gertz, "S. Africa to Test Ballistic Missile," *Washington Times*, 3 May 1991, and "Libya May Buy N. Korean Missiles," *Washington Times*, 4 June 1991.

9. For a similar judgment, see Michael T. Klare, "Growing Firepower in the Third World," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 46, no. 4 (May 1990): 10.

10. On Saddam's maneuvers, see Elaine Sciolino, "Iraqi Atomic Admission: Mixed Blessing for Bush," *New York Times*, 10 July 1991.

11. Safa Haeri, "Iran: Behind the Football Riots," *Middle East International*, 2 March 1990, 15, and "The Row in Teheran," *Middle East International*, 11 May 1990, 5; Scheredazade Daneshku, "Iran Makes the Most of It," *The Middle East*, December 1990, 5-7; Judith Miller, "Islamic Radicals Lose Their Tight Grip on Iran," *New York Times*, 8 April 1991, and "Iran Tries to Decentralize Economy, Causing Widespread Pain," *New York Times*, 9 April 1991; Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Iran's Leaders Ask Wide Cooperation and Ties to West," *New York Times*, 28 May 1991.

12. For these countries' attitude on the subject, see "Gulf States Seek Alliance with Tehran Government," *Washington Post*, 6 May 1991; and Carol Berger, "Egypt Pulls Troops Out of Regional Force," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 May 1991.

13. For evidence that this view of the US-Israeli relationship is widely shared by informed Americans, see A. F. K. Organski, *The \$36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in US Assistance to Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Helena Cobban, *The Superpowers and the Syrian*

Israeli Conflict: Beyond Crisis Management? Washington Paper 149 (New York: Praeger with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991), chap. 3. Even critics of the perspective concede that it is the prevailing outlook in the United States. See, for example, Cheryl A. Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interests: A Critical Examination* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1986).

14. *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 118-19; Cobban, 50-58; Margo MacFarland, "Reported \$2-Billion Syrian/Soviet Arms Deal Sparks Concern," *Inside the Army*, 8 April 1991, 1; Richard Ellis, "Syria Goes on 2 Billion Pound Shopping Spree for Arms," *Sunday Times* (London), 5 May 1991.

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16. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1989-1990* (London: Brassey's, May 1990), 148-50; Michael Breen, "North Korea in Gulf Shock," *Washington Times*, 12 March 1991; Edward Nellian, "Nuclear Bomb Plant Expansion Has Neighboring Countries Edgy," *Washington Times*, 1 April 1991; David E. Sanger, "Seoul Says North Is Moving Forward," *New York Times*, 14 June 1991.

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18. Steven Erlanger, "Ending Talks, All Cambodia Parties Commit Themselves to UN Peace Plan," *New York Times*, 11 September 1990.

19. "Cambodian Factions Agree to Halt Arms Imports," *New York Times*, 25 June 1991; Philip Shenon, "Prospects for Peace in Cambodia Grow as China Talks Approach," *New York Times*, 14 July 1991.

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21. See, for instance, "Risky Business," *Newsweek*, 16 July 1990, 16-19.

22. *Ibid.*

23. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," *International Security* 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990-91): 58-91; V. P. Gagnon, Jr., "Yugoslavia: Prospects for Stability," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 17-35; Chuck Sudetic, "Yugoslav Planes Strafe and Bomb Breakaway State," *New York Times*, 29 June 1991; John Tagliabue, "Cease-Fire in Yugoslavia Begins to Unravel Amid New Skirmishes," *New York Times*, 30 June 1991; David Binder, "How Tito's Heirs Made a Mess of Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 30 June 1991; Chuck Sudetic, "Belgrade Orders an Army Pullback in Rebel Slovenia," *New York Times*, 1 July 1991; Alan Cowell, "Yugoslavia's Army Opens Big Attack Against Croats," *New York Times*, 22 September 1991; the country and regional analyses since June 1990 in the weekly *Report on Eastern Europe*, published by the RFE/RL Research Institute.

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25. "Thousands of Albanians Flee to Greece," *New York Times*, 2 January 1991; "Athens Is Alarmed Over Refugees from Albania," *New York Times*, 3 January 1991; Paul Anastasi's articles for the *New York Times*: "Albanians Still Stream Into Greece Though Athens Asks Them to Stop," 4 January 1991; "Albanians in Greece Vow No Return," 5 January 1991; "Flow of Refugees From Albania Continues," 6 January 1991; "Athens Chief Is Cheered by Greeks in Albania," 15 January 1991.

26. "Turkey Cuts Euphrates Flow, Affecting Its Neighbors," *New York Times*, 14 January 1990.

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27. See, for example, Amb Hermann Friedrich Eilts, "Islamic Fundamentalism: A Quest for a New Order," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (Fall 1990):

27-45; Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Algeria Imposes a Curfew and Promises to Use Force," *New York Times*, 7 June 1991.

Chapter 3

Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces

AMONG the major threats to US security interests in the foreseeable future, Soviet strategic nuclear forces will come next after regional conflicts. An attack on the US by these forces is highly improbable—in fact, it is the least likely to materialize of all of the potential challenges to US security. The changes under way in the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the attempted coup by hardline political elements in August 1991 make it even more improbable than ever before. But this sort of attack would wreak such havoc if it did take place that the forces merit substantial US concern. These forces may well decrease in the years ahead, but they will still remain imposing.

Explanation

TODAY, the Soviet Union is the only country in the world with the capacity to inflict catastrophic damage on the US through the employment of nuclear weapons, and it in all likelihood will retain that unique status well into the twenty-first century. Despite the weakening of central authority that appears to be taking place in the Soviet Union, the key republic leaders favor retention of some form of central government with responsibility for, among other things, the military—including nuclear forces. Of the other acknowledged nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom each have just a small number of delivery vehicles with sufficient range

to reach the US, and, as US allies, they have shown no inclination to acquire vast quantities of additional vehicles of this sort. China, too, lacks much in the way of credible delivery systems. Although it is currently expanding its strategic forces, this program is proceeding at a slow pace because of its fairly low position on the Beijing government's overall scale of investment priorities. Thus, China probably will not pose a major strategic challenge to the US for decades. None of the de facto nuclear powers mentioned earlier currently has the means to strike the US, and the chances that these countries will develop such means in the foreseeable future are remote. The same goes for the aspiring nuclear powers.¹

Since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, to be sure, the Soviet leadership has striven to convince Washington that the Soviet Union harbors no aggressive intent toward the US. Top Soviet officials have propounded the "new thinking" that development of the combat capabilities of the Soviet armed forces should be based on the principle of "reasonable sufficiency," and at Soviet instigation, the members of the Warsaw Pact proclaimed in May 1987 their commitment to a doctrine of "defensive defense."² In accordance with these shifts in verbal posture, the Soviet Union has taken some concrete steps of note. It has withdrawn or agreed to withdraw all of its troops from Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, and Mongolia, and it has vigorously pursued negotiations on both conventional and strategic arms control. In the process of these negotiations, it has

even accepted verification measures far more intrusive than any which it had been willing to consider previously.³

In the strategic realm specifically, the Soviet leadership has indicated that Soviet-US parity is what it desires. Moreover, it has held that cuts in the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces will not necessarily harm Soviet security as long as parity exists. Indeed, it has conducted strategic arms control negotiations with the avowed purpose of reducing the strategic nuclear forces of both superpowers by 50 percent.⁴

Such behavior lends great credence to the current Soviet leadership's claim that it envisions no offensive actions against the United States.⁵ Yet several considerations suggest that Moscow will never consent to dispose of all of its nuclear weapons—despite its proposals to the contrary.⁶

Perhaps most important, the dominant political elite in the Soviet Union in the early 1990s seems bent on retaining superpower status for the country—a goal whose accomplishment requires possession of nuclear weapons, especially in light of the weak condition and poor prospects of the Soviet economy.⁷ President Gorbachev, for example, has depicted attempts to break up the Soviet Union into its constituent republics as a threat to the country's superpower role in the global arena; moreover, he has pointed specifically to the deleterious impact that such a development could have on the country's military position there. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has been less explicit than Gorbachev on the subject but nonetheless has been clear. Yeltsin has supported the preservation of a central government with control over defense, and although he has endorsed "substantial reduction of military expenses" and the concept of "defense sufficiency," he has spoken as well of the need "to maintain parity with other nations."⁸

In addition, the Soviet Union has to worry about countries other than the US that already possess nuclear weapons and delivery systems capable of reaching Soviet territory or that may obtain them within a relatively few years. For example, the Soviet Union has in the past quarreled severely with China, and even though Moscow has carried out a rapprochement with Beijing since the 1980s, considerable potential remains for a future clash between the two countries because of conflicting national interests. To take just one more case, the Soviet Union has had a troubled relationship with Iran throughout most of the post-World War II period; that pattern persists today. The clerics currently in authority in Tehran regard the Soviet Union as a "satan," second only to the US in evil qualities. It is virtually inconceivable that Soviet leaders would give up their capability to retaliate decisively against such states if they employed nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.

Soviet leaders also have to be aware that the US is highly unlikely to agree to discard all of its nuclear weapons. The mere hint that President Ronald Reagan toyed with the idea of accepting Gorbachev's 1986 proposal at Reykjavik for the superpowers to eliminate nuclear weapons from their arsenals provoked a storm of controversy in the US. Opposition to such a step stemmed in part from a fear that the large size of standing Soviet conventional forces would then tip the military balance in favor of the Soviet Union, but this concern was by no means the only one involved. Although the territory of the US lies farther away from other present or potential nuclear powers than does that of the Soviet Union, any deliverable nuclear weapons in the hands of such countries as Iran or Iraq would cause the US great unease if it lacked the means to deter or counter their employment. As long as the US refuses to get rid of all of its nuclear weapons the Soviet

Union will undoubtedly do the same, on grounds of the need to maintain parity.

There is even some concrete evidence that the Soviet Union may not contemplate ever abandoning nuclear weapons completely. Despite the now concluded Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the Soviet Union, like the US, has persisted in its efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces to improve their lethality, responsiveness, and survivability. These efforts have encompassed all three fundamental elements of the forces—land-based ballistic missiles, ballistic-missile-launching submarines, and aircraft.⁹

In evaluating the challenge created by Soviet strategic nuclear forces, it would be irresponsible for the US to rely solely on the discernible intent of the existing Soviet leadership. That intent could change, either through a shift in the leadership's attitudes or through a switch in the leadership itself. The unsuccessful coup in August 1991 by conservatives opposed to Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies underscores this point. Although many quarters have hailed the failure of this undertaking as a turning point in Russian and Soviet history, anti-Western and right-wing forces remain a factor in Soviet politics and Soviet society at present; only time will tell whether they will wind up consigned to the dustbin of history. If they do not, Soviet military capabilities could assume critical importance. Therefore, Soviet capabilities as well as intent must be taken into account in the threat assessment.

Scope of the Challenge

IN attempting to gauge the exact nature of the threat that Soviet strategic nuclear forces will represent for the US in the years ahead, it is imperative to begin by looking at the situation at the outset of the 1990s. Appendixes 1 and 2 provide

an overall picture of current Soviet and US strategic nuclear forces.

At present, the Soviet Union possesses the means of intercontinental delivery against the US of 12,733 or 12,693 individual nuclear weapons, depending on whose estimate of Soviet land-based ballistic missiles (LBBM) is used. However, the US has the means for intercontinental delivery against the Soviet Union of 14,876 individual nuclear weapons. Thus, the US seems to enjoy the requisite for deterrence of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. That is, the US would probably retain enough firepower to inflict devastating damage on the Soviet Union even if the Soviet Union launched a first strike. A couple of additional considerations enhance this probability. Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) have a relatively low level of accuracy in comparison with those of the US, and the Soviet Union possesses far fewer air launched cruise missiles (ALCM) than does the US (see the appendixes).¹⁰ The first factor not only greatly reduces the number of US nuclear weapons that Soviet SLBMs would be able to eliminate but also means that far fewer US SLBMs would have to survive to destroy the same amount of Soviet weapons. The second factor would compel most Soviet aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard to get close to their targets to employ these weapons, thereby raising the possibility that the aircraft would never reach their targets. Most US aircraft, in contrast, could discharge a large proportion of their nuclear weapons at designated targets from a remote, much safer distance.

Yet the aggregate figures do not tell the whole story. There are features of the situation which, although they do not negate the deterrent impact of existing US forces, do suggest possible new dangers in this regard for the future.

As the breakdowns in the appendixes show, the Soviet Union and the US have opted for quite different mixes of nuclear delivery systems. The Soviet Union has put primary stress on LBBMs, while the US has chosen to rely on a fairly balanced triad of LBBMs, SLBMs, and manned aircraft.

Moreover, the new LBBMs that the Soviet Union has been deploying since the early 1980s have included large numbers of heavy missiles (SS-18s) and mobile missiles (rail-mobile SS-24s and road-mobile SS-25s).¹¹ The heavy missiles already in place in the Soviet Union raise questions about the survivability of US LBBMs, even in the hardened sites in which these are now deployed. Although US deployment of existing or additional Peacemakers in rail-mobile fashion, as originally intended, would reduce the vulnerability of the US's overall LBBM force considerably, the prospects for such a development remain highly uncertain. Continuing Soviet deployment of heavy missiles in the coming years would merely enhance the LBBM problem for the US. The mobile Soviet LBBMs serve to improve the survivability of the Soviet Union's LBBM force. They are much more difficult to find and target effectively than fixed site missiles. Further deployments of such missiles can only increase US difficulties in mounting a credible second strike against Soviet LBBMs.

The import of these growing Soviet LBBM capabilities becomes manifest when they are put in a larger context. Various studies have indicated that with strategic warning (time to move to a crisis-alert status) about 95 percent of the US bomber force would be able to get off the ground, but these studies have predicted that without such warning only about 80 percent of the bombers on alert would survive a nuclear attack. Because just roughly 30 percent of the bomber force is normally on alert at any given time, this estimate means that about 75

percent of the total bomber force would be destroyed in such a situation.¹² It is also conceivable that in the future the Soviet Union could manage to improve the accuracy of its SLBMs and/or its ability to fix and attack US submarines carrying SLBMs.¹³ Such developments would render the sea component of the Soviet Union's forces more formidable than it currently is and would degrade the effectiveness of the sea leg of the US triad. In light of these considerations, present trends in the character of the Soviet LBBM force could bring about a serious erosion of the general deterrent posture of the United States.

The US is seeking to address the Soviet LBBM issue as well as to cut back the overall numbers of strategic nuclear weapons of both superpowers through START. According to the terms of the START agreement reached by the two countries in July 1991, both sides will be limited to 6,000 nuclear weapons on 1,600 delivery vehicles, and only 4,900 of the weapons can be on ballistic missiles (LBBMs and SLBMs). There will also be separate ceilings of 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy LBBMs and 1,100 warheads on mobile intercontinental missiles. Furthermore, Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight will be reduced by 50 percent. For counting purposes, each penetrating bomber (one that carries only short-range missiles and gravity weapons) will constitute a single weapon, regardless of its actual weapons load. Each US bomber capable of carrying long-range cruise missiles may have no more than 20 such missiles on it, but the first 150 bombers will count as carrying 10 missiles apiece. Each Soviet bomber of a similar nature may have only 16 long-range cruise missiles on it; however, the first 180 bombers will count as carrying only eight apiece. Sea-based cruise missiles with ranges above 373 miles will be limited to 880.¹⁴

If ratified by the two states, this agreement will impose significant restraints on

all components of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The Soviet Union will have to dispose of nearly 50 percent of its existing stock of intercontinentally deliverable nuclear weapons, almost 60 percent of its nuclear weapons on LBBMs/SLBMs, and roughly 35 percent of all of its intercontinental delivery systems. In addition, it will lose about 50 percent of its heavy SS-18 missiles, and those remaining will have only half of the throw-weight that they have at present.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union would still retain major capabilities to employ nuclear weapons intercontinentally against the US. Indeed, if the modernization programs now under way and proceeding apace continue, Soviet strategic forces would probably wind up more accurate, survivable, and reliable by the close of the 1990s than they are cur-

rently. The LLBM element would in all likelihood consist predominantly of mobile missiles of the SS-24, SS-25, or follow-on types; however, the heavy SS-18s would continue to carry about half of the warheads on LBBMs. Although the fleet of SLBM carrying submarines would probably be substantially smaller than that of today, these submarines would have nearly the same number of warheads on them as the present fleet does. The operational bomber element in all likelihood would not differ much in size from the current one, but it would include more aircraft capable of carrying long-range cruise missiles. As for the overall balance of the elements, bombers would represent a higher proportion of the delivery systems and would account for a larger share of the total nuclear weapons than they do at present.¹⁵

Notes

1. In early September 1991, the leaders of 10 republics of the Soviet Union and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev presented a plan to an emergency session of the Congress of People's Deputies calling for preservation of a central government but restriction of its writ to defense, foreign affairs, and certain economic functions. Michael Dobbs, "Gorbachev, 10 Republics Propose New System," *Washington Post*, 3 September 1991. Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian republic, subsequently proposed that in light of the aversion of the other republics to the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, all nuclear weapons be transferred to Russian soil. See the Cable News Network interview with Yeltsin, 3 September 1991, as published in "Interview With Yeltsin: 'Russia Has Changed, Gorbachev Has Changed,'" *New York Times*, 4 September 1991.

On the capabilities of the other admitted, de facto, and aspiring nuclear powers, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's, Autumn 1990), passim; Leonard R. Spector with the assistance of Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions, the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: 1989-1990* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), chap. 3; Martin Navias, *Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World*, Adelphi Papers 252 (London: Brassey's, Summer 1990).

2. By now, Western analyses of the Soviet security outlook in the post-1985 era have become legion. For a sense of the range of treatments of the subject, see Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *Internat-*

tional Security 12, no. 3 (Winter 1987-88): 93-131; Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security* 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 124-63; George E. Hudson, ed., *Soviet National Security Policy under Perestroika* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1989); "The Red Army on the Defense? Reporting New Doctrine and the Changing Soviet Threat," *Deadline* 5, no. 2 (March-April 1990); William E. Odom, "The Soviet Military in Transition," *Problems of Communism* 39, no. 3 (May-June 1990): 51-71. The full text of the Warsaw Pact statement may be found in "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States," *Pravda*, 31 May 1987.

3. *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (Paris, 19 November 1990), Protocol on Inspection.

4. See Meyer for discussion with sources.

5. It should be stressed here, however, that significant elements of the Soviet military reject all or portions of the perspective of Gorbachev and his allies. See, for example, R. Hyland Phillips and Jeffrey I. Sands, "Reasonable Sufficiency and Soviet Conventional Defense," *International Security* 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 164-78; and Odom.

6. On 15 January 1986, Gorbachev suggested that the USSR would eliminate all of its strategic nuclear weapons by 2000 if the US did the same. When he met with President Reagan at Reykjavik in October 1986, he offered to accomplish this by 1996. See P. Edward Haly, "You Could Have Said Yes: Lessons from Reykjavik," *Orbis* 31, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 75-97.

7. This position does have critics within the political establishment. For an especially frank Soviet analysis of the differences on the issue, see A. Kortunov and A. Izumov, "What Is Meant by State Interests in Foreign Policy," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 11 July 1990. A good illustration of the arguments advanced by the critics is A. Vasilev, "I Know That You Know. . . . Why, When Talking About Soviet Foreign Policy, Do We Not Always State the Obvious Out Loud?" *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 25 November 1990.

It should also be pointed out that many prominent American observers believe that the USSR has already lost superpower status. See, for instance, the speech by Robert Gates, deputy national security adviser, quoted in Paul Bedard, "US Declares Itself the Sole Superpower," *Washington Times*, 8 May 1991.

8. On Gorbachev, see "Gorbachev Addresses Nation on Referendum," address by Soviet President Mikhail Sergel'vich Gorbachev, Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian, 6 February 1991, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, 7 February 1991, 24; his address to the Supreme Soviet on 27 August 1991, as translated by Cable News Network, "Gorbachev in Parliament: To Prevent Our Country From Falling Apart," *New York Times*, 28 August 1991. Regarding Yeltsin, see his comments during the 3 September 1991 session of the Congress of People's Deputies, as translated by Cable News Network, "Deputies' Debate: 'We've Thrown Way Too Many Stones' at Gorbachev," *New York Times*,

4 September 1991; and Cable News Network, interview, 3 September 1991.

9. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1990), chap. 5.

10. For details, with sources, see Lt Comdr David Allan Leary, *Optimizing the Post-START US Strategic Nuclear Force Mix* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1990), 3-5.

11. *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 51-52.

12. By way of illustration, see Congressional Budget Office, *Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces: The Administration's Program and Alternatives* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1983), especially 105 and appendix E.

13. *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 53, 82-83.

14. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1989-1990* (London: Brassey's, May 1990), 194-201; Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Issues Book 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 31; R. W. Apple, Jr., "Pact Is Reached to Reduce Nuclear Arms; Bush and Gorbachev to Meet This Month; 7 Powers Give Soviets New Economic Role," *New York Times*, 18 July 1991; Thomas L. Friedman, "Bush and Gorbachev Close Era in US-Soviet Relations," *New York Times*, 18 July 1991; "New Arms Pact: The Highlights" and R. W. Apple, Jr., "Bush and Gorbachev Sign Pact to Curtail Nuclear Arsenals; Join in Call for Mideast Talks," *New York Times*, 1 August 1991.

15. For similar judgments, see *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 51-54; Leary, chap. 4.

Chapter 4

Anti-US Terrorism

ANTI-US terrorism will stand third on the list of important challenges to US security over the next decade or so. Acts of this sort are almost as likely to occur as regional conflicts are, but the effect on the US of all such acts combined would probably fall well shy of the impact of a single regional conflict and would certainly be of a wholly different order of magnitude from that of a Soviet nuclear attack on the continental US. Thus, this threat will run substantially below the top two in terms of severity. Nonetheless, the challenge still will be of consequence.

Reasons

SEVERAL factors enter into such an assessment. International terrorism has been increasing since the late 1960s, although with peaks and valleys over time,¹ and American citizens and facilities abroad have been and continue to be the principal objects of attack. Between 1968 and mid-1985, for instance, there were 1,257 terrorist incidents aimed at US interests. This sum exceeded by about 40 percent the combined total of those incidents directed at the interests of the next four countries after the US in the ranking (891).² In 1985, the US constituted the target of about 25 percent of the terrorist incidents recorded; in 1989, the figure went above 30 percent, although the trend over the intervening years had not been uniformly upward.³

All signs point to the likely persistence of these conditions for the indefinite future. For example, international terrorist

incidents reached about 100 during the first month of 1991—up significantly from the monthly average of 40 or so during the previous two years. Of the incidents in 1991, roughly 70 involved the US and its allies in the Persian Gulf war.⁴

Terrorist activities, furthermore, can pose far greater security challenges than statistics on terrorist incidents may suggest. Such activities often are not merely random undertakings but part of a broader picture. Specifically, they may be designed to induce the target state or government to do something that it might otherwise not do in light of its perceived security interests, or to discourage that state or government from doing something that it might wish to do in pursuit of its discerned security interests. For example, the terrorist attack on US Marines in Lebanon in 1982 was clearly intended to persuade Washington to withdraw its peacekeeping forces from the country, while the seizure of American hostages by pro-Iranian terrorist groups in the late 1970s and early 1980s was plainly aimed at preventing the US from intervening militarily in Iran. In both cases, the terrorist efforts succeeded in accomplishing the desired end.

With regional conflicts destined to assume higher priority in future US security calculations, this general consideration regarding terrorism will almost certainly increase in salience in the years ahead. Many of the existing international terrorist organizations have their roots in the regions where the conflicts of greatest current or potential concern to the US

from a security standpoint are going on or might develop, and the positions of these groups on the issues at stake, or likely to be at stake, clash with those which the US takes or probably would take.⁵ Thus, the US may well confront an intensification of attempts to influence its policies on particular regional conflicts through terrorist means.

Such a prospect is enhanced by the emergence since the 1970s of state-sponsored terrorism. To further their own political goals, various governments have become directly involved in terrorist undertakings or have lent their support to existing terrorist groups. This support has consisted not only of encouragement of the groups' activities but also of provision of safe havens, financial resources, arms, and documentation. Muammar Qadhafi's regime in Libya, for instance, has sought to weaken the close ties between the US and Israel by such undertakings as the April 1986 bombing of a West Berlin nightclub frequented by US servicemen. In this case, the order for the attack by an Arab terrorist band came from Tripoli via Libya's people's bureau (embassy) in East Berlin, and the bureau helped to set up the infrastructure to carry out the venture.⁶

All of the countries that the American government has formally classified as sponsors of state terrorism lie in regions of prime security interest to the US. These countries include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Cuba.⁷ Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, it is true, both Syria and Libya have endeavored to rein in the terrorist groups that they support, but it remains to be seen whether this moderation will last.⁸

Of relevance, too, are certain developments pertaining to international terrorist organizations themselves. The number of these organizations has grown appreciably since the late 1960s, and at least a portion of them have established

informal ties with one another. Only a handful of groups conducted international terrorist operations in the late 1960s;⁹ however, even though some of these original groups disappeared over the years, by the opening of the 1990s the Department of State could identify no less than 54 organizations that were carrying on such activities.¹⁰ From time to time since the early 1980s, there has been evidence of cooperation between individual groups on a particular terrorist undertaking. The bombing of a USO club in Naples, Italy, in April 1988, for instance, appears to have been perpetrated by elements of the Japanese Red Army and a Palestinian organization.¹¹ Thus, the US in the coming years will in all likelihood confront a terrorist challenge not only highly diverse in character but on occasion even loosely coordinated.

Terrorist organizations also now enjoy access to both larger quantities of weapons and items of greater sophistication and lethality than they had in earlier years. For example, in the 1980s various Middle Eastern groups managed to build bombs containing more than 1,000 pounds of explosives, and the perpetrators of the bombing of a Pan American airliner that went down in Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988 used not only plastic explosives but also a detonating device which activated when the plane reached a predetermined altitude.¹² In part, this new access reflects the increased availability of a wide assortment of weapons in the international arms market because of the mounting competition among arms suppliers that a significant expansion of their ranks has created;¹³ in part, this access stems from intensified interaction with states that support terrorist activities.

This situation probably will continue to prevail for the indefinite future—especially if state sponsorship of terrorism persists—for most of the governments that have been supporting

terrorism in recent years have been engaged in major military buildups (see the earlier discussion of regional conflicts). Terrorist groups might even have at their disposal highly sophisticated and lethal weapons hitherto unavailable to them or available only in limited quantities. Among such items would almost certainly be portable precision guided munitions, which have already been employed in a few cases by terrorist groups, and the items might well include chemical and biological weapons.¹⁴ Nuclear weapons are also a possibility, but a less likely one.

Origins and Locales of Threat

ALTHOUGH there can be little doubt that the US will face a significant threat from international terrorism in the years ahead, foreseeing the exact shape of this challenge is exceedingly difficult. Appendix 3 lists the groups that the Department of State deemed to be involved in international terrorism at the outset of the 1990s.¹⁵ As it indicates, only 36 of the 54 groups had conducted operations against US interests since the mid-1980s. Of these 36, nine are South American leftist organizations; eight, West European leftist groups; eight, Palestinian separatist or pro-Palestinian organizations; five, Central American leftist groups; two, Japanese leftist organizations; one, a Catalan separatist group; one, an Armenian separatist organization; one, an Islamic fundamentalist and pro-Iranian group; and one, a Filipino leftist organization.

Yet this list could change rapidly. In fact, two Colombian groups, the M-19 and the People's Liberation Army, have already disappeared from it; and a Salvadoran one, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), seems to be in the process of doing so.¹⁶ It is

possible as well that some of the groups currently engaged in terrorism against targets other than the US might decide to enlarge the focus of their operations to include the US. In addition, several organizations still in being not only conducted terrorist activities but directed some of these at US interests prior to the mid-1980s;¹⁷ they could conceivably resume anti-American undertakings in the future. Finally, it should be remembered that since the late 1960s new terrorist organizations have formed and old ones have dissolved. Consequently, some of those conducting anti-US terrorism today could vanish, and others might appear.

Similar uncertainties exist with respect to the sites of anti-American attacks in the future. As of the late 1980s, most attacks of this nature were occurring in Latin America. Fifty-eight percent of all assaults on US citizens or facilities in 1988 took place there; the figure for 1989 was 64 percent. In comparison, East Asia and the Pacific accounted for 21 percent and 17 percent of the total in the two years, respectively; Western Europe, 11 percent and 6 percent; the Near East and South Asia, 7 percent and 11 percent; and Africa, 4 percent and 4 percent.¹⁸ However, the same pattern had not prevailed earlier in the decade. At some times, the primary scene of anti-US terrorist operations had been Western Europe; at other times, the Middle East had qualified for this honor.¹⁹

A combination of circumstances does suggest that the Middle East may regain its prominence in this connection during the coming years. Chief among these is the higher profile that the US has assumed in the region since Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Although Washington may seek to reduce the US role in the area in the years ahead, there seems to be little chance that US involvement in Middle Eastern affairs will go back to its pre-August 1990 level. In

contrast, since early 1990 the turmoil in Central America and the controversy over US activities there have died down considerably, with the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the evolution of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Movement toward participation in El Salvador's political life. Within Europe, furthermore, the collapse of communist rule in most of Eastern Europe

and the increased contacts between NATO and the Soviet Union have lifted some of the stigma formerly attached to NATO in the eyes of leftist activists in Western Europe.

But such a prediction must be treated as tentative. The world is in sufficient flux at the moment—and likely to remain so for a substantial period—that the picture could alter drastically in short order.

Notes

1. See, for example, B. M. Jenkins, "The Future Course of International Terrorism," in *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 582; Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988* (Washington, D.C., March 1989), 1, and *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989* (Washington, D.C., April 1990), 1.

2. These statistics, based on the Rand Corporation's "Chronology of International Terrorism," are cited in B. Hoffman, "Terrorism in the United States during 1985," in Wilkinson and Stewart, 240, note 2.

3. *Ibid.*, 230; *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988*, 1 and 4, and *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989*, 1-2 and 4. Note that *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989* gives a lower sum for anti-US incidents than does Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans, 1989* (Washington, D.C., June 1990), 1. If the higher amount is used in the calculations, then some 35 percent of the total terrorist incidents in 1989 were directed at the US.

4. David Johnston, "70 Terrorist Acts Outside US Listed," *New York Times*, 1 February 1991; George Lardner, Jr., "State Department Notes Increase in Terrorist Acts," *Washington Post*, 12 February 1991.

5. For descriptions of groups that have engaged in international terrorism in recent years and of their outlooks, see Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, *The Never-ending War: Terrorism in the 80's* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1987), appendixes, "Who's Who of Terror," 295-305; *Terrorist Group Profiles* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1988); *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989*, appendix B, 55-85.

6. Shortly after the bombing, President Reagan revealed the contents of coded signals between Tripoli and the East Berlin people's bureau that provided convincing evidence in this regard. The signals had been intercepted by the National Security Agency. For further discussion, see Dobson and Payne, 76-77.

7. This list was put out by the State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism and reported in George Lardner, Jr., "Terrorist Incidents

Down 15%, State Dept. Says," *Washington Post*, 1 May 1991.

8. See Michael Wines, "International Teamwork May Have Foiled Terror," *New York Times*, 4 March 1991; and Lardner, "Terrorist Incidents Down 15%."

9. Jenkins, 583.

10. *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989*, appendix B, 55-85.

11. Avot Kurz et al., "Palestinian International Terrorism: Current Trends and Political Implications," in *INTER: International Terrorism in 1988* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1989), 18-19; Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans, 1988* (Washington, D.C., May 1989), 29-30.

12. Jenkins, 587; David A. Brown, "Bomb Destroys Pan Am 747 in Blast Over Scotland," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 2 January 1989, 28-29; "Bomb in Forward Hold Destroyed Pan Am 747, Investigators Find," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 16 January 1989, 62; "On the Trail of Terror," *U.S. News & World Report*, 13 November 1989, 44-46.

13. On this heightened competition, see Joseph F. Clare, Jr., "Whither the Third World Arms Producers," in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 1987), 23-28; Morton S. Miller, "Conventional Arms Trade in the Developing World, 1976-86: Reflections on a Decade," in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987* (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, March 1988), 19-21.

14. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front of El Salvador, for instance, used some Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles in its operations in early 1991. See "Salvadoran Rebels Return 8 Missiles to Nicaragua," *New York Times*, 3 February 1991; Lauren Weiner, "Salvador Rebels Are Well Armed," *Washington Times*, 28 March 1991.

15. The US government defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." International terrorism is "terrorism involving the citizens or ter-

ritory of more than one country." See *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989*, v.

16. "What Happened to Guerrilla Bands" and James Brooke, "Colombian Guerrillas Forsake the Gun for Politics," *New York Times*, 2 September 1990; "More Rebels in Colombia Lay Down Their Arms," *New York Times*, 27 January 1991; "Colombia Rebel Group Quits After 23 Years" and Mark A. Uhlig, "Salvador Guerrillas Pledge Not to Disrupt Next Election," *New York Times*, 2 March 1991; Mark Uhlig, "Top Salvador Rebel Alters His Goals," *New York Times*, 7 March 1991; Shirley Christian, "Salvador Chief Sees Better Chance for Peace," *New*

York Times, 10 March 1991; James Brooke, "Mass Graves Linked to Colombian Rebels," *New York Times*, 7 April 1991.

17. See, for example, the discussions in *Terrorist Group Profiles*, passim.

18. These statistics are based on data in Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans, 1988*, 1, and *Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans, 1989*, 1.

19. Compare the breakdowns in *Terrorist Group Profiles*, 4, 31, 74, 114, and 128.

Chapter 5

Soviet Conventional Military Forces

THE LAST serious challenge to US security in the discernible future will stem from Soviet conventional military capabilities. In recent years, the likelihood that the Soviet Union will employ its conventional military assets in a manner adverse to US security has diminished considerably. In part, this trend reflects a dramatic shrinking of those assets themselves. Not only has the demise of the Warsaw Pact deprived the Soviet Union of the support of East European military forces, but Soviet leaders have also ordered unilateral reductions in Soviet forces. Soviet conventional capabilities will decline still further by the mid-1990s if Soviet leaders complete their promised military withdrawal from Eastern Europe and implement the terms of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

In part, the trend derives as well from the shifting relationship between the central government and the republics in the Soviet Union. Under the new political arrangements now taking shape, the central government will retain basic responsibility for the country's defense, but the republics will evidently have a substantial say in military affairs. The ministry of defense, for instance, has indicated that it will allow each republic to become a single military district, and local military commands will be answerable both to the republics and to the center.¹ Such a system of control will at least inhibit the launching of offensive Soviet military actions against neighboring or nearby states—particularly those

to the west and south, where non-Russian republics lie along the borders of the revamped Soviet state.

Even under these conditions, however, the Soviet Union will continue to have a significant capacity to operate beyond its border with conventional means. The forces available to it could conceivably do substantial harm to US security interests.

Basis of Judgment

SUCH A Soviet military potential will be of concern to the US for a variety of reasons. First, the Soviet leadership plainly wants decreased international tension for the next several years to ensure the proper climate for dealing with the Soviet Union's economic problems and its domestic political turmoil, but the leadership's long-term intentions with respect to the outside world remain open to debate. Indeed, even informed Western observers differ as to those intentions.

Some analysts argue that the Soviet leadership anticipates merely a pause in its global struggle for power until it gets the Soviet Union's house in order. Once the leadership manages to solve the country's economic and internal political difficulties, the analysts contend, it plans to return to a more assertive posture in international affairs; moreover, an improved economy will give the Soviet Union a much better basis for developing and employing military forces than it enjoys at the moment. As confirmation of their

viewpoint, these analysts point to features of Soviet behavior such as the attempt after November 1990 to exempt three motorized infantry divisions from the limits of the CFE Treaty by reclassifying them as naval infantry, and the transfer in 1989-91 of large stocks of weapons and equipment to areas east of the Ural Mountains instead of destroying them in accordance with at least the spirit of the CFE Treaty.²

Other commentators hold that the Soviet leadership has committed itself to "new political thinking" in the security realm. That is, it now recognizes that the Soviet Union's past belligerence and heavy reliance on military means in the global arena have not served Soviet interests well. Such an approach merely heightened hostility toward the Soviet Union and adversely affected its security. This perspective, these observers declare, represents a sea change in Soviet outlook and could become irreversible if the leadership manages to institutionalize it. To sustain their position, they cite such evidence as the increased cooperation of the Soviet Union with the US to try to resolve regional conflicts and Moscow's new stress on working through the UN to handle a myriad of international problems.³

A third group of observers maintains that whatever the ultimate intentions of the Soviet leadership toward the outside world, the realities confronting that leadership will determine its specific course; however, the analysts disagree among themselves about the nature of both the realities and the course. Some hold that a variety of domestic and international constraints give the Soviet Union little choice but to stay on its present path indefinitely. They claim, for example, that the economic and political troubles of the Soviet Union are so severe as to defy easy solution. In support of this claim, these analysts note that in the 1990s Soviet economic conditions have

worsened and the centrifugal political pressures have increased, as compared even with the late 1980s.⁴ Others insist that it is highly unlikely that the Soviet leadership or their successors will manage to transform the country into a global good neighbor, for the traditional political-strategic culture of Russia/the Soviet Union, the institutions of the Soviet state, or objective conditions related to the preservation of internal political stability will prevent this. Even if a significant amount of restructuring of the Soviet economy and polity does take place, the result, they say, will be a Soviet Union that will be a more formidable competitor of the West in general, and the US in particular, than the Soviet Union has proved to be in the past.⁵

All these interpretations involve a high degree of speculation. The lurch toward radical internal change in the wake of the failed coup in August 1991 makes it tempting to judge that the weight of the evidence now favors the more optimistic of the assessments, yet such a conclusion would fly in the face of some negative features of the new situation. At the helm of a significant number of the republics, which have acquired vastly increased powers in the revised Soviet order, are the same conservatives. These leaders have latched on to nationalist appeals as a means of entrenching themselves in authority, and they do not share the views of the reformers on either international or domestic matters. No less telling, Boris Yeltsin, the hero of the moment for his role in the resistance to the coup, has at times betrayed a disturbing tendency to talk and act like a Russian chauvinist. Such circumstances suggest that in the years ahead the US cannot prudently ignore Soviet conventional military capabilities in thinking about the sources of threat to its security.

Second, the Soviet leadership's policies in the global arena are not cast in stone; they could alter in response to evolving

conditions in the world. For instance, all available signs indicate that Mikhail Gorbachev and his close associates had no desire to bring about the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe when they began to promote *perestroika* (Restructuring) there. Rather, they accepted such an outcome as inevitable only after it became apparent that the communist regimes in Eastern Europe lacked the popular backing necessary to survive without an ongoing Soviet pledge to intervene to keep them in power. This kind of commitment, Moscow realized, would undermine its efforts to improve Soviet relations with the West—efforts vital to its attempts to revive the Soviet Union's economy.⁶

The outcome of events of August 1991 in the Soviet Union may have decreased the chances of a negative shift, from the US standpoint, in the Soviet leadership's approach to the outside world, but it has not eliminated the possibility. Were such a shift to take place, then the conventional military forces of the Soviet Union would become highly relevant. Hence, to overlook these forces even in a period of fairly amicable interaction between the two states would be dangerous.

Third, the current Soviet leadership is not necessarily a permanent fixture of the Soviet Union's political landscape; nor would a new Soviet leadership inevitably adopt the present one's positions on international issues. Developments of August 1991 highlighted this reality. Although the State Committee for the State of Emergency established by the conservative forces that tried to seize power proclaimed its intention to continue Gorbachev's policies and honor the country's commitments,⁷ this assurance was widely discounted in the West, for these elements in the Communist party bureaucracy, the state security police (the KGB), and the military had strongly resisted Gorbachev's initiatives in inter-

national affairs during the preceding months.⁸

With the collapse of the coup attempt, the odds that a right-wing central government exercising dominance over all of the republics remaining in the union might emerge have fallen drastically; however, they have still not reached zero. The perpetrators of the coup have been relieved of their posts, major personnel shake-ups are being carried out at the upper levels of the Soviet central hierarchy, and communist functionaries have been banished from all types of workplaces. Yet conservatives remain numerous in many of the administrative bodies that have escaped abolition thus far; moreover, they have strongholds in the institutions of a variety of the republics. Over time, they might be replaced by individuals of a progressive stripe, and/or the organizations in which they exist might be disbanded or reduced in importance. But until such changes come to pass, the possibility that conservative forces might again chart the basic direction of the country cannot be dismissed.

In this light, Soviet conventional military capabilities take on added significance. They would go a long way toward determining the kind of military activities in which a new Soviet leadership unfriendly to the US might engage.

Nature of the Challenge

IN estimating the scope of the threat to US security that Soviet conventional military forces will represent over the next decade or so, it is crucial to begin by recognizing some basic realities. The Soviet Union has quite limited capabilities to project military power for great distances abroad, and these capabilities derive from secondary roles of forces whose primary mission is to operate in areas contiguous or close to

Soviet borders. Moreover, the capacity of the US to function militarily in remote regions considerably exceeds that of the Soviet Union.⁹ Therefore, the true challenge to US security interests from Soviet conventional military forces will lie in those regions adjacent to or near the Soviet Union but far from US shores. Three such regions will be of the greatest importance in light of the extent of US security concerns there—Europe, the Middle East/Southwest Asia, and the Far East.

In addition, the Soviet threat will vary from one of these key areas to another. Not only will Soviet capabilities differ from place to place, but the constraints imposed on the actions of the central government by the powers of republics will also be disparate. Accordingly, the situation in each area needs to be addressed individually.

Europe

In the 1990s the US remains as interested as it has been throughout the entire post-World War II period in preventing a single power from gaining dominance of industrialized Western Europe by means of arms. From this standpoint, it is not insignificant that the Soviet Union continues to have the most formidable conventional military forces in Europe.

To be sure, the Soviet Union's capabilities to conduct offensive operations in the region have declined markedly since the late 1980s. The sweeping political changes in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have denied Moscow the use of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces for theater offensive operations. Indeed, the Soviet Union cannot rule out the possibility that East European militaries might now even actively resist such operations. Furthermore, the force withdrawals from Eastern Europe that the Soviet Union has already carried out have considerably diminished

Soviet forward deployments against NATO countries, and if Moscow lives up to its pledges, Soviet military forces in the region will be functioning solely from their own territory by the mid-1990s.

The reductions, restructuring, and reorganizations of the Soviet military that the Soviet leadership decreed prior to August 1991 have resulted in a slimming down of the forces at their disposal for offensive actions. By late 1990, the total of active Soviet divisions had fallen from 214 to about 190, while the number of mobilization divisions had risen only from three to six. The light bomber component (Su-24 Fencer) of the Air Armies of the Supreme High Command had dropped 50 percent, and the fighter element (MiG-23 Floggers and Su-27 Flankers) had decreased by a lesser, but still meaningful, amount. Frontal aviation forces had experienced similar cut-backs through reduction in the size of tactical combat regiments, removal of entire regiments, and resubordination to Soviet Naval Aviation and Aviation of Air Defense.¹⁰

Finally, because of the implication of many senior Soviet military officers in the August 1991 coup attempt, a major purge of the officer corps is now in progress. As already noted, Gen (now Marshal) Shaposhnikov, the new minister of defense, has said that he expects to replace 80 percent of the top officers in this shake-up. Such a turnover will inevitably affect the general proficiency of the Soviet military for a significant period.

Yet the Soviet Union retains substantial means of carrying out conventional offensive undertakings against NATO states. In the central region, some of the 10 tank divisions and nine motorized infantry divisions that it had in the eastern portions of Germany and Poland at the close of 1990 will stay there until 1994.¹¹ But powerful inhibitors against the launching of an offensive Soviet operation exist on this front. There are uncertain-

ties, to begin with, about how East European militaries would react to such a Soviet venture and what other difficulties the Soviet Union might encounter in trying to reinforce and supply its forward-deployed forces. Then questions arise as to whether the non-Russian border republics along this front—Belorussia and the Ukraine, two of the largest republics—would approve an offensive undertaking by the center that would smack of Russian imperialism. Under the planned revamping of Soviet military districts to coincide with republics and the projected sharing of authority over troops in each district between the center and the republic, officials in Belorussia and the Ukraine would presumably have at least some voice in a decision on the matter.

The restraints are much less severe, however, with respect to NATO's northern and southern flanks. There the Soviet Union has territory contiguous to northern Norway and eastern Turkey, and it possesses far from inconsequential capabilities to attack Denmark across the Baltic Sea and western Turkey across the Black Sea.¹² Hence, not only would it have a tenuous basis for depicting an offensive military effort as defensive in nature, but it could also move offensive forces into combat and provide them with logistical backup with relatively little or no outside interference. Obstructive actions by newly independent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania might complicate an undertaking against Denmark, and similar activities by Georgia, if it gains independence, could do the same for a venture against Turkey. Yet none of these entities boasts military forces of real consequence at the moment. Nor is any of them likely to develop such forces in the foreseeable future.

Moreover, the Soviet Union enjoys a favorable balance of ground and air forces in both areas. As table 1 details, Soviet active forces of these kinds in the present

military districts close to Norway/Denmark and Turkey greatly outnumber the NATO active forces in the two areas in every category except manpower and divisions in the case of Turkey. Confining the comparison to the military districts nearest the land borders (the Leningrad district in the north and the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus districts in the south) does not materially alter the picture. Of no less significance, the weapons and equipment that Norwegian/Danish and especially Turkish forces have available to them tend to be less modern than those available to Soviet forces. This disparity has increased as the Soviet Union has postured itself for a post-CFE situation, for the Soviet military has withdrawn obsolete items from units along the flanks and has replaced them with more advanced ones that it has removed from the central region.¹³

These capabilities vis-à-vis Norway/Denmark and Turkey are of special concern to the US. Norway and Denmark constitute the key impediments to Soviet naval access to the Atlantic Ocean via either the Barents and Norwegian seas or the Baltic and North seas, and if all Soviet attack submarines in the Northern and Baltic fleets (estimated at 105 and 25, respectively, in late 1990) could operate simultaneously in the Atlantic Ocean, they might seriously disrupt the sea-lanes of communication between the US and Europe. Turkey controls the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, straits through which Soviet naval forces must pass on the way from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean Sea via the Aegean Sea. Were the Soviet Union able to use these waterways at will, it could conceivably put enough naval assets into the Mediterranean to hamper navigation through the region, especially in the eastern part. At the end of 1990, the Soviet Union's Black Sea fleet included an estimated one guided missile aviation

TABLE 1
Selected Measures of Military Capabilities
1990

	Manpower	Active Divisions	Tanks	Armored Combat Vehicles	Artillery	Combat Aircraft	Attack Helicopters
Norway	28,800	1/3	117	320	527	92	0
Denmark	26,300	2	336	582	553	164	14
Total	55,100	2 1/3	453	902	1,080	256	14
Leningrad Military District	163,000	3	1,200	4,982	2,136	435	40
Baltic Military District	132,000	5	2,488	4,179	2,628	670	120
Total	295,000	8	3,688	9,161	4,764	1,105	160
Turkey	531,400	171/3	3,270	3,064	3,539	456	20
Odessa Military District	120,000	1	1,760	3,470	2,646	390	110
Kiev Military District	108,000	2	4,484	5,588	2,715	60	110
North Caucasus Military District	39,000	4	1,636	3,346	1,616	0	0
Transcaucasus Military District	160,000	7	2,640	6,021	2,100	540	200
Total	427,000	14	10,520	18,425	9,077	990	420

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's, Autumn 1990), 232-33. The estimates for Norway, Denmark, and Turkey in this document vary somewhat from the figures that the two states themselves actually submitted in November 1990 in accordance with procedures of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. See "Comparison of CFE Declarations and Residual Ceilings," *Survival* 33, no. 1 (January-February 1991): 83. In part, the differences for Turkey arise from the fact that the count of items restricted under CFE excludes weapons and equipment in the southern part of the country along the Syrian and Iraqi borders, but the reasons for the other discrepancies are not clear. To minimize extraneous variables as well as to cover all of Turkey, it seemed desirable to use the IISS estimates throughout.

cruiser, 27 larger principal surface combatants, 29 attack submarines, and 227 naval aircraft.¹⁴

Soviet implementation of the CFE Treaty would place additional limitations on the Soviet Union's capacity to pursue offensive operations in Europe. In part, these limitations flow directly out of the provisions of the treaty; in part, they reflect the anomaly that while the treaty balances authorized holdings by NATO and the Warsaw Pact of five types of military items, the Warsaw Pact has col-

lapsed, leaving the Soviet Union on its own.

As table 2 shows, the treaty would restrict Soviet tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters west of the Urals to totals less than those for the NATO countries combined. But these figures by themselves overstate the impact that fulfillment of the treaty's provisions would have on the Soviet Union's military position. Other factors would probably, or could conceivably, temper the effect.

First, the announced 1994 force-level goals of NATO states in the five spheres covered by the treaty fall substantially below the treaty's maximum allotments,

while the declared goals of the Soviet Union do so only marginally (see tables 2 and 3). This difference would work to Soviet advantage in the balance.

Table 2

Ceilings on Selected Military Items in the Area from the Atlantic to the Urals under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty

	<i>Tanks</i>	<i>Armored Combat Vehicles</i>	<i>Artillery</i>	<i>Combat Aircraft</i>	<i>Attack Helicopters</i>
Soviet Union	13,300	20,000	13,700	5,150	1,500
NATO	20,000	30,000	20,000	6,800	2,000

Source: *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (Paris, 19 November 1990), especially article IV (1) and VI.

Table 3

Ceilings Planned for 1994 on Selected Military Items in Light of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty

<i>Country</i>	<i>Tanks</i>	<i>Armored Combat Vehicles</i>	<i>Artillery</i>	<i>Combat Aircraft</i>	<i>Attack Helicopters</i>
Soviet Union	13,150	20,000	13,175	6,800	1,500
Belgium	334	1,099	320	232	46
Canada	77	277	38	90	13
Denmark	353	316	553	106	12
France	1,306	3,820	1,292	800	352
Germany	4,166	3,446	2,705	900	306
Greece	1,735	2,534	1,878	650	18
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	1,348	3,339	1,955	650	142
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	743	1,080	607	230	69
Norway	170	225	527	100	0
Portugal	300	430	450	160	26
Spain	794	1,588	1,310	310	71
Turkey	2,795	3,120	3,523	750	43
UK	1,015	3,176	636	900	384
US	4,006	5,372	2,492	784	518
NATO Total	19,142	29,822	18,286	6,662	2,000

Source: "Comparison of CFE Declarations and Residual Ceilings," *Survival* 33, no. 1 (January-February 1991): 83.

Second, the primary Soviet military challenge to NATO in the past has been in the central region (Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France), and if one confines the assessment of the potential balance to the forces most relevant to this region, a situation less unfavorable to the Soviet Union emerges. Compare, for example, the potentially employable Soviet forces and the forces of the states of the central region plus the forces of Denmark and those states with troops currently stationed in central region countries (the US, the United Kingdom, and Canada). The Soviet Union would be at a substantial disadvantage with respect to attack helicopters, would have parity in armored combat vehicles, would enjoy a slight edge in tanks and combat aircraft, and would have a big advantage in artillery. Such a comparison, admittedly, provides only a crude measure of the implications of the accord for the Soviet Union's offensive capabilities vis-à-vis the central region, for a Soviet attack on the central region probably would not directly engage all of the forces of either the Soviet Union or many of the affected NATO countries. Yet the comparison does suffice to make the fundamental point.

Third, the NATO totals include the weapons that Canada and the US foresee having in Europe. Should either of them—particularly the US—decide to cut its forces there, NATO's European members might fail to compensate by raising their intended force levels. Such inaction would benefit the Soviet Union in the balance.

Questions remain, however, about the ultimate fate of the CFE Treaty. Soon after the signing of the document in November 1990, the Soviet Union threw the accord's future into doubt by insisting on excluding three motorized infantry divisions from the count under it, on the grounds that they were naval infantry. There was also accumulating evidence

that the Soviet military had been moving large amounts of treaty-applicable equipment east of the Urals instead of destroying it.¹⁵ Consequently, the Bush administration refused to submit the treaty to the US Senate for consideration until these matters were resolved to US satisfaction.

A compromise agreement was reached by the Soviet Union and the US in early June 1991 and then formalized at a meeting of all parties to the treaty in mid-June. The Soviet Union committed itself to count the disputed naval infantry units against the previously accepted ceilings and not to expand these units. NATO, in turn, consented to forgo routine inspections (though not short-notice "challenge" inspections) of naval infantry equipment to ensure compliance with CFE restrictions and to exempt from the treaty about 1,700 armored personnel carriers operated by Soviet strategic rocket forces. The Soviet Union also pledged to destroy or convert 14,500 tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery pieces east of the Urals. This figure represented about a quarter of the equipment that it had transferred from west of the Urals between January 1989 and November 1990. In a nonbinding undertaking, the Soviet Union promised, too, that the remaining armaments beyond the Urals would not be used to create a strategic reserve or stored in a way to permit their rapid return to Europe.¹⁶

This compromise accord prompted the Bush administration to submit the CFE Treaty to the US Senate for ratification just before the abortive August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union. But as centrifugal tendencies mounted in the Soviet Union after the collapse of the coup, the Senate put the treaty on hold, for there was widespread recognition in the West that if a large number of independent states replaced the single union, negotiations on the treaty would probably have to be reopened, with all of the attendant

problems that such a step would entail. The outline agreement on a restructured Soviet Union reached by President Gorbachev and 10 republic leaders in early September 1991 seems to have eased fears on this score, but it is still not clear how soon the Senate might resume consideration of the treaty. When it does, the involvement of the Soviet military in the attempted coup and the continuing instability in the Soviet Union ensure that the document will receive close scrutiny.

In addition, the Soviet leadership still must obtain ratification of the treaty. According to one of the two resolutions approved by the emergency session of the Congress of People's Deputies on 5 September 1991, the Council of Republics of the Supreme Soviet will have responsibility for such a procedure during the transition to a new constitutional order.¹⁷ Yet it is uncertain whether or when this body might actually take up the treaty in light of the urgency of the task of producing a revised constitution.

Despite these hurdles, the odds appear fairly good that the provisions of the treaty will ultimately become reality, for these provisions satisfy some important interests of both the Soviet Union and NATO countries. The treaty permits the Soviet Union to reduce its military costs without increasing risks to its security, as

a result of the balanced thinning out of forces in the region by prescribed zones. NATO benefits because the treaty significantly decreases Soviet capabilities to launch a full-scale, multipronged attack against members of the alliance. Even if the Soviet Union did not destroy any of its excess holdings of the five kinds of treaty-limited items and merely moved them to areas east of the Urals, NATO states would have considerably more warning time of a Soviet assault than they have anticipated in the past.¹⁸

If the treaty is not implemented, of course, the balance pertaining between the Soviet Union and the NATO countries with respect to the five types of treaty-restricted items at the time of the signing of the accord will continue to prevail (see table 4). Under such circumstances, Soviet leaders might seek to render their holdings equal to NATO holdings by shifting some weapons and equipment now east of the Urals back into the western Soviet Union and/or by producing and deploying additional pieces. As mentioned earlier, even Russian President Yeltsin has endorsed military "parity" with other countries to ensure reasonable security. Such actions would obviously restore some of the Soviet Union's capacity to carry on offensive operations that it has lost since the late 1980s.

Table 4

Declared Holdings of Selected Military Items, November 1990

	Tanks	Armored Combat Vehicles	Artillery	Combat Aircraft	Attack Helicopters
Soviet Union	20,694	29,628	13,828	6,445	1,330
NATO	25,091	34,453	20,620	5,939	1,736

Source: "Comparison of CFE Declarations and Residual Ceilings," *Survival* 33, no. 1 (January-February 1991): 83.

Even if the CFE Treaty does enter into full effect, however, the Soviet Union will retain enough capabilities to conduct limited offensive operations against

NATO's northern and southern flanks and perhaps its central region. In the case of the central region, the Soviet capacity to pursue such operations will

depend on two things: (1) whether Soviet military manpower drops significantly either through unilateral Soviet actions or under an agreement reached in follow-on CFE negotiations, and (2) how many Soviet combat divisions the Soviet leadership opts to preserve west of the Urals in at least a low state of readiness. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Union enjoyed a considerable advantage over NATO states in manpower for employment in the central region—2.2 million to 1.3 million. It also had $45\frac{1}{3}$ active divisions or division equivalents focused on the area, while NATO states had only $42\frac{1}{3}$.¹⁹ As long as there is no severe restriction on military manpower and a reasonably high number of Soviet divisions continues to exist, the foundation would be present for significant military undertakings against NATO states in the region, even though East European militaries might impede such a venture. But Soviet leaders would need to take some preparatory steps before launching any enterprise of this kind. Specifically, they would have to bring all of the divisions up to a high state of readiness, and they would have to outfit these with an increased number of offensive weapons, whether by retrieving stocks previously moved east of the Urals or by supplying them with newly manufactured items. Both of these efforts could require a substantial amount of time.

About NATO's northern and southern flanks there are no such elements of uncertainty. Under the terms of the CFE Treaty, for example, Norway and Denmark propose to keep 170 and 353 tanks, respectively, or a sum of 523, while the present Baltic and Leningrad military districts would probably have a total of 1,517. The Leningrad Military District alone would account for 678. Turkey would possess 2,795 tanks in the portions of the country covered by the treaty (which excludes Turkish territory along

the Syrian and Iraqi borders), and the Odessa, Kiev, North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus military districts would in all likelihood have 4,689. But the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus military districts by themselves would probably wind up with just 2,250.²⁰

The foregoing assessment of the future European situation does not take account of qualitative factors such as training and leadership. Although these factors will have relevance on all fronts, they will probably not prove decisive anywhere except possibly in the central region. Here the balance of forces will in all likelihood be relatively equal, and the qualitative advantage will almost certainly lie with NATO forces.

Middle East/Southwest Asia

The US has an interest in access to the oil of the Middle East/Southwest Asia for itself and its allies, and the importance of such access will inevitably increase in the future as reserves elsewhere dwindle. Furthermore, the US has a major stake in preserving freedom of passage through the sea-lanes of the region—not just because of the oil traveling along them but because of other commerce as well. Consequently, Washington cannot be oblivious to the fact that the Soviet Union remains the most potent single conventional power in the area, with appreciable means at its disposal for pursuing offensive ventures there.

Since Gorbachev withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, it is true, the size of Soviet forces arrayed against the states of Southwest Asia has shrunk. For instance, Soviet ground forces in the North Caucasus, Transcaucasus, and Turkestan Military Districts have fallen from about 30 to roughly 25 divisions. Troop totals have dropped correspondingly, by about 60,000 men.²¹

In addition, the new political and military arrangements now taking shape in the Soviet Union will impose important constraints on the center's ability to initiate an offensive operation in Southwest Asia. As noted previously, the republics that remain within the union will apparently share control of the troops in their territories with the center, so some or all of the republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia would probably have to consent to any attack southward that originated from their soil. Obtaining their concurrence could prove exceedingly difficult in light of the ethnic ties between the inhabitants of these republics and the peoples just beyond Soviet borders in Southwest Asia.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union continues to deploy military forces along its southern borders that are superior to those of any country of Southwest Asia; they even exceed those that Iraq had prior to its defeat at the hands of the US-led coalition in early 1991. Aside from about 25 motorized infantry and tank divisions, the Soviet Union in late 1990 maintained one airborne division and 18 fighter and fighter-bomber regiments in the area. The ground elements came equipped with as many as 6,600 main battle tanks, perhaps 6,600 artillery pieces, and some 300 combat helicopters, while the air units had more than 700 combat aircraft, including technologically sophisticated Su-24s and MiG-29s.²²

From a geographic standpoint, the logical route for a Soviet military thrust toward the top strategic prize of Southwest Asia—the oil of the Persian Gulf—lies through neighboring Iran, and Iran has at best modest military forces. Toward the close of 1990, it boasted only seven infantry divisions, four armored divisions, one airborne brigade, and 12 fighter squadrons. Its ground forces possessed maybe 500 main battle tanks, 800 artillery pieces, and 100 attack helicopters, while its air forces had some 185

combat aircraft, of which an estimated 72 were serviceable. These planes consisted essentially of F-4s, F-5s, and F-14s—none of which were comparable to the most advanced Soviet aircraft.²³

Despite such a major military imbalance, it is by no means certain that a Soviet assault on Iran would yield more for the Soviet Union today or in the foreseeable future than control of northern Iran. Lines of communication from north to south in Iran cross exceedingly rough terrain; therefore, movement must normally proceed along major arteries and is highly subject to interdiction by air and/or special forces. In addition, Soviet forces would confront a shortage of readily accessible water and bitter extremes of temperature.²⁴ Last but not far from least, outside powers, particularly the US, would almost assuredly come to Iran's aid.

The capacity of the US to furnish quick and meaningful assistance in such a situation, moreover, will probably improve as a result of the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990-91. Prior to that conflict, the US military presence in the Southwest Asia region was quite limited. It typically consisted of a small naval force in the Persian Gulf, usually a command ship and four combatants, plus backup naval forces in the Indian Ocean. The one major exception was in 1987-88 during the last stage of the Iran-Iraq war, when the Joint Task Force Middle East was temporarily deployed to the Persian Gulf.²⁵ In the wake of the conflict with Iraq over its seizure of Kuwait, however, it seems highly likely that the normal American presence in the Persian Gulf will expand, although the great bulk of the forces assigned there during the crisis will return home. The new units could well include elements of US Central Command's headquarters and some US ground and air forces.

Of course, the Soviet Union would not necessarily launch a direct attack on Iran

to try to gain a foothold on the Persian Gulf; it might have other options available to work toward this goal. Iran's population contains large numbers of minorities, and some of these groups inhabit the areas along the Soviet-Iranian borders and have cultural and religious brethren on the Soviet side. Were individual minorities or all of them together to revolt against the central authorities in Iran, the Soviet Union might support the rebellions militarily in an effort to install a client regime in Tehran. This policy would be especially tempting if Iran's existing central government was weak. Such Soviet military involvement would present the US and other outside powers with a more ambiguous situation than a direct attack, and it would greatly decrease the chances of direct military intervention by them, although some countries might provide noncombatant military aid to the central government if asked for aid of this sort.

The Soviet Union's capacity to engage in offensive undertakings in the waters around the region is even more limited. In the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviet flotilla has declined in size since the late 1980s. At the beginning of the 1990s, it was averaging 25-35 ships at any given time. Of them, four to nine were large principal surface combatants such as cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and periodically an aircraft carrier, while two to four were attack submarines.²⁶

These numbers exceeded the combined naval forces of all the Middle Eastern countries along the eastern Mediterranean littoral.²⁷ Yet the flotilla fell well shy of the roughly 100 principal surface combatants and about 50 attack submarines that the US Sixth Fleet and NATO European maritime units in the Mediterranean could typically muster.²⁸ In addition, it displayed some major deficiencies that rendered it exceedingly

vulnerable to US and NATO European naval forces. It had inadequate air defenses, limited logistical support, and poor capabilities to counter hostile submarines.²⁹

In the years ahead, Soviet leaders could decide to commit a larger share of their naval assets, particularly their attack submarines, to the Mediterranean, and/or Soviet naval development programs could produce significant new assets that might be deployed there. With respect to the latter point, it is of relevance that in late 1990 the Soviet Union was carrying out sea trials of its first conventional takeoff-and-landing aircraft carrier, was outfitting a second, and was constructing a third.³⁰ Nevertheless, the existing military imbalance appears unlikely to be remedied even in the medium-term future. The reductions in Soviet military forces and outlays that seem to loom on the horizon in the wake of the failed Soviet coup in August 1991 provide reinforcement for such a judgment.

A similar situation prevails on the Indian Ocean side of Southwest Asia. At the end of 1990, the Soviet naval squadron in the area, 12-14 ships on the average, was down in size from the late 1980s, but it still dwarfed the naval forces of the local states. Nonetheless, it did not come close in magnitude to the forces that the US and NATO European countries had there, and it evinced the same sort of operational vulnerabilities as the Mediterranean flotilla. The military buildup in the Arabian Sea during 1990-91 by the coalition seeking to free Kuwait merely exacerbated the disparities.³¹ Although many of these new forces will not stay in the area long because Iraq has now departed from Kuwait, the prospects over the next decade or so for much

amelioration of the military imbalance confronting the Soviet Union in the area seem quite dim.

The Far East

In the Far East, the US retains as strong an interest as ever in ensuring that no other country controls the waterways and airspace that extend eastward from the Asian continent. Not only do these waterways and this airspace constitute the only barriers between US and Soviet territory in the north, but farther to the south commerce of great value to the US passes through them. By the late 1980s, Japan ranked second among the trading partners of the US, and the Republic of Korea had moved up among the top ten.³² Because Japan now possesses an economy second to none except that of the US, the US could also experience highly adverse consequences if another country gained dominance over Japan. For all of these reasons, the offensive conventional forces that the Soviet Union maintains in the region amount to a potential threat to the US.

Although the Soviet leadership has cut back Soviet ground and air forces in the Far East since the late 1980s, most of the changes have affected the Soviet Union's posture toward China rather than toward Japan or locales farther east. The four Soviet army divisions and one Soviet naval infantry division opposite Japan in the occupied northern territories of Japan, on Sakhalin Island, and on the Kamchatka Peninsula remain in place. By late 1990, the numbers of Soviet combat aircraft deployed in the Transbaikalian and Far East Military Districts had declined substantially as a result of a net reduction of three tactical air regiments, leaving a total of 24 regiments with about 800 combat airplanes, and it was reported that another eight regiments were slated to be disbanded or withdrawn. Yet the ongoing modern-

ization of those left—through the entry into their inventories of Su-24 Fencer Es, MiG-29 Fulcrums, and Su-27 Flankers—will render them more formidable than before. Of particular relevance to Japan and the US is the capability of the Flanker to serve as a long-range escort for Soviet bombers. Thus far, the 200 Soviet intermediate- and long-range bombers in the region have been untouched by the restructuring of the Soviet air forces, and they can still attack Japan, the Pacific, and even the continental US.³³

Soviet naval forces in the Far East have not experienced much impact from the Soviet leadership's efforts to decrease Soviet military forces. As of late 1990, the principal naval surface combatants assigned there totaled 69 (including two carriers with vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, 15 cruisers, seven destroyers, and 45 frigates); however, three or four of these ships were normally on deployment in the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea at any given time. Attack submarines numbered about 70, of which one or two were typically on deployment in the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea. The naval air elements consisted of 233 combat aircraft and 89 combat helicopters. Of the combat aircraft, 71 were bombers and 93 were fighters.³⁴

In late 1990, US military analysts estimated that these figures would stay relatively the same for the foreseeable future, although these analysts did anticipate a drop in the amount of attack submarines to about 60–65 units. Yet they expected a considerable growth in the combat capabilities of the naval forces. Soviet surface warships, for instance, probably would increase their capacity for firing surface-to-surface missiles by 100 percent and their capacity for firing surface-to-air missiles by 50 percent, and the sum of such ships with long-range antisubmarine weapons will in all likelihood rise by 40 percent. By the year 2000, the fleet's amphibious lift

would probably be sufficient to carry about 80 percent of the fleet's naval infantry assault forces, as compared with 50 percent at the outset of the 1990s. Among the Soviet attack submarines there would undoubtedly be more modern, quiet boats with improved combat systems and greater numbers of weapons.³⁵

Exactly how the foregoing picture will be affected by the intensified push to reduce Soviet military expenditures that the unsuccessful Soviet coup of August 1991 seems to have generated is unclear at this juncture. The odds appear fairly good, however, that even if there are further cutbacks in forces and cancellations of new weapons systems under development, weapons modernization programs already under way will continue.

To gauge the real import of Soviet capabilities, it is necessary to put them in proper context, for any Soviet attempt at an offensive operation eastward from the Asian continent would certainly meet with military resistance from at least Japan and the US. The Republic of Korea might feel inclined to join in that resistance, but the combination of the heavily armed forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea poised on the Republic of Korea's borders and the Seoul government's own limited naval and air assets would probably preclude much, if any, involvement in defensive actions beyond its own territory.³⁶

On the ground, Japan appears to possess forces more than adequate to handle the four army divisions and one naval infantry division that the Soviet Union has deployed against it—especially in light of the constraints on Soviet amphibious undertakings. In late 1990, Japan had in active service 12 infantry divisions and one armored division dispersed throughout its territory. Moreover, these forces were outfitted with large numbers of weapons and equipment, many of them of a high degree of

technological sophistication. The list included 1,222 main battle tanks, 550 armored personnel carriers, 2,250 artillery pieces and mortars, and 50 attack helicopters.³⁷ Although changes unfavorable to Japan could conceivably take place in this aspect of the regional military balance in the coming years, it seems most unlikely that they would be of sufficient scope to alter the basic situation that currently prevails.

Japan's air and naval assets, however, are considerably less impressive than those of the Soviet Union in the immediate area. Although Japan does boast an imposing air defense system, as of the end of 1990 it possessed only 387 combat aircraft (plus 50 in storage), and in line with the Japanese constitution's provision restricting military forces to those designed for self-defense, there were no bombers among them. As for naval forces, Japan had 68 principal surface combatants, but 58 of them were frigates. The total included just six destroyers and no cruisers or aircraft carriers. Furthermore, Japan possessed only 14 tactical submarines, and its maritime air arm consisted of just 86 combat aircraft (plus 15 in storage) and 60 armored helicopters.³⁸

US air and naval forces in the area supplement these Japanese capabilities. In late 1990, the US had one air division with 120 combat aircraft stationed in Japan, and one aircraft carrier, eight naval surface combatants, three amphibious ships, and three submarines had home ports there. There were also two air wings with 72 combat aircraft in the Republic of Korea, but as long as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to pose a major threat on the Korean Peninsula, employment of these planes in other crisis contingencies would be highly problematic, at least for any extended period.³⁹

Farther away, the US does have some other forces that it could bring into play

in the Far East. At the close of 1990, a US air wing with 48 combat aircraft was stationed in the Philippines, but with the US withdrawal from Clark Air Base, this unit will probably wind up in Guam. In addition, 17 submarines and 16 principal surface combatants are home ported in Hawaii.⁴⁰ Theoretically, the US could also move a large portion of the remainder of its 180-ship Pacific Fleet into the region if sufficient time were available, but the problems of ensuring air cover and repair, maintenance, and resupply facilities for such a force would no doubt render this course impractical. Moreover, some of these naval assets help perform the vital function of defense against intermediate- and long-range bomber attacks deep into the Pacific.⁴¹

On balance, then, the raw numbers as of the early 1990s suggest that the Soviet Union enjoys an edge over the Japanese and US forces arrayed against its offen-

sive air and naval forces; nevertheless, other comparative factors such as individual unit capabilities, technological differences, state of training, and tactical innovativeness tend to offset this disadvantage for the Japanese and US forces.⁴² It is not a foregone conclusion, however, that such circumstances will persist over the next decade or so. Unless the size of Soviet forces throughout the entire Pacific region declines during the next few years by at least the 10 to 12 percent that Washington envisions for US forces by the mid-1990s, some compensatory elements will prove essential, or the military balance in the Far East could tip toward the Soviet Union.⁴³ That qualitative considerations alone will suffice is far from certain. Japan might need to assume an enlarged military role, and whether it would agree to do so is not at all clear.

Notes

1. According to an interview with the news agency Interfax by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, president of the Armenian Republic, cited in Celestine Bohlen, "Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Tense Allies, Push Union Plan," *New York Times*, 4 September 1991.

2. For statements along these lines, see Gerhard Wettig, "New Thinking' on Security and East-West Relations," *Problems of Communism* 37, no. 2 (March-April 1988): 1-14; Jean Quatras [pseud.], "New Soviet Thinking Is Not Good News," *Washington Quarterly* 11, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 171-83; Stephen P. Adragna, "A New Soviet Military? Doctrine and Strategy," *Orbis* 33, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 165-79; James M. McConnell, *Soviet Military Strategy Towards 2010*, CRM 89-286 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, November 1989); Judy Stone, *The Coming Soviet Crash: Gorbachev's Desperate Pursuit of Credit in Western Financial Markets* (New York: Free Press, 1989); Sol Sanders, *Living Off the West: Gorbachev's Secret Agenda and Why It Will Fail* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1990); editorial, "End of Arms Control?" *Wall Street Journal*, 12 February 1991; Roland Evans and Robert Novak, "Same Old Soviets," *Washington Post*, 22 February 1991.

3. See, for example, Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security* 12, no. 3 (Winter 1987-88): 93-131; Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," *Washington Quarterly* 11, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 131-58; Paul

Marantz, "Soviet 'New Thinking' and East-West Relations," *Current History* 87, no. 531 (October 1988): 309-12, 345-47; Bruce Parrott, "Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev," *Problems of Communism* 37, no. 6 (November-December 1988): 1-36; Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 1 (1988/89): 82-98; David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 1 (1988/89): 66-81; Jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Politics," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 55 (Winter 1989/90): 26-41; Cristoph Bluth, *New Thinking in Soviet Military Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990); Philip D. Stewart and Margaret D. Hermann, "The Soviet Debate over 'New Thinking' and the Restructuring of US-Soviet Relations," in *Soviet National Security Policy Under Perestroika*, ed. George E. Hudson (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1990), 47-69; Jacob W. Kipp, "Gde zhe ugroza? Soviet Military Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era," *Military Review* 70, no. 12 (December 1990): 2-15; Robert Legvold, "Soviet Policy in East Asia," *Washington Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 129-42.

4. Representative of this perspective is Allen Lynch, "Does Gorbachev Matter Anymore?" *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 19-29. Although such an outlook does not appear frequently in published sources, the present author has heard it expressed on a number of occasions in oral discussions.

5. A typical elaboration of such an outlook may be found in Colin S. Gray, "Do the Changes Within the Soviet Union Provide a Basis for Eased Soviet-American Relations? A Skeptical View," in *Soviet-American Relations After the Cold War*, ed. Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), 61-75.

6. For a first-rate discussion of this subject, see Charles Gati, "East and West in Europe," in Jervis and Bialer, 149-55.

7. "State of Emergency Committee's Statement: 'A Mortal Danger Has Come'," *New York Times*, 20 August 1991.

8. Parrott; Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security* 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 124-63; Stephen Foye, "Military Hard-Liner Condemns 'New Thinking' in Security Policy," *Report on the USSR* 2, no. 28 (13 July 1990): 4-6; Alexander Rahr, "A Pyrrhic Victory for Gorbachev?" *Report on the USSR* 2, no. 29 (20 July 1990): 6-8; Stephen Foye, "Defense Issues at the Party Congress," *Report on the USSR* 2, no. 30 (27 July 1990): 1-5; Lawrence T. Caldwell, "Soviet-American Relations: The Cold War Ends," *Current History* 89, no. 549 (November 1990): 343-45; Bill Keller, "KGB Chief Warns Against West's Aid to Soviet Economy," *New York Times*, 23 December 1990; David Hoffman, "US Officials See Signs of Cooperation by Soviets," *Washington Post*, 23 May 1991; Serge Schmemmann, "Soviet Hard-Liners Keep Up the Attack," *New York Times*, 25 June 1991.

9. For a similar conclusion after a detailed analysis of the available evidence, see Michael T. Klare, "The Limits to Long-Distance Intervention: Soviet Capabilities for Power Projection in the Third World," in *Limits to Soviet Power*, ed. Rajan Menon and Daniel N. Nelson (Lexington, Ky.: Lexington Books, 1989), 157-78.

10. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1990), 76, 78-79.

11. On Soviet deployments in Eastern Europe in late 1990, see *ibid.*, 94.

12. See the breakdown of Soviet forces, including amphibious and naval air assets, in the Baltic and the Black Sea fleets, *ibid.*, map insert.

13. See, for instance, Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change 1989* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1990), 96-98; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's, Autumn 1990), 34-36, 75-76, and 80-82; *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 94-96; Clyde Haberman, "Turks Claim Benefit of Allied Victory," *New York Times*, 13 March 1991.

14. On the submarines in the Baltic and Northern fleets and the offensive naval forces in the Black Sea fleet, see *Soviet Military Power 1990*, map insert.

15. See, for example, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 31; Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets Shift Many Tanks to Siberia," *New York Times*, 15 November 1990; Richard C. Gross, "20,500 Soviet Tanks Go East," *Washington Times*, 11 January 1991; Warren Strobel, "Soviets Want Units Exempt from Treaty,"

Washington Times, 14 February 1991; Barbara Starr, "CFE: Soviets Store 10,000 Tanks," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 16 March 1991, 365; William Beecher, "Disarmed Soviets Vex NATO Planners," *Minneapolis Star-Tribune*, 4 April 1991.

16. Alan Riding, "US and Soviets Bridge Gap on Conventional Weapons and Plan for Summit Soon," *New York Times*, 2 June 1991; Michael Z. Wise, "Soviets Accept Limits on Arms in Europe," *Washington Post*, 15 June 1991.

17. Article 2 of the "Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the organs of state power and government of the USSR in the transition period," as translated by the Associated Press, "Soviet Resolutions: The Will of the Republics and the Interests of the Nation," *New York Times*, 6 September 1991.

18. For elaboration of these points, see, for instance, Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan," *New York Times*, 2 August 1990; *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 96-97; Jenonne Walker, "New Thinking about Conventional Arms Control," *Survival* 33, no. 1 (January-February 1991): 53-65. Although these and other estimates suggest that NATO will have up to two years' warning time of a massive Soviet attack after implementation of the CFE Treaty, Gen John Galvin, supreme allied commander, Europe, rejects this judgment as excessive. He maintains that the Soviet Union could put together 45 divisions with 13,000 tanks west of the Urals in about 45 days. *The Times* (London), 1 June 1991.

19. These figures were derived from data in *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, table 4, 232-33.

20. See "Comparison of CFE Declarations and Residual Ceilings," *Survival* 33, no. 1 (January-February 1991): 83; "Conventional Forces in Europe: The Effect on Warsaw Pact Forces," in *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 230. It should be noted that the estimate by the International Institute for Strategic Studies of the likely deployment of Soviet tanks under the CFE Treaty assumed that 4,500 Soviet tanks would remain in Eastern Europe. By 1994, the Soviet Union probably will have these tanks stationed on Soviet territory. If so, the balance along the northern and southern NATO flanks could well be more unfavorable to Norway/Denmark and Turkey than the above figures suggest. This is particularly true with regard to Turkey, against which the greater number of tanks would in all likelihood be targeted.

21. *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 97.

22. *ibid.*; and *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 42, 100-122, *passim*.

23. *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 103-5.

24. On the physical impediments to a rapid Soviet advance through Iran to the Persian Gulf, see Keith A. Dunn, "Constraints on the USSR in Southwest Asia: A Military Analysis," *Orbis* 25, no. 3 (Fall 1981): 617-19; and *Soviet Military Power 1989*, 122.

25. *Soviet Military Power 1989*, 121-22; *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 97; and *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 26.

26. *Soviet Military Power 1989*, 121, and *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 97 and map insert; *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 40.
27. *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 104, 107, 110, 119.
28. *Ibid.*, 25, 59-86, *passim*, and especially 234.
29. *Soviet Military Power 1989*, 121.
30. *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 83-84.
31. *Soviet Military Power 1989*, 121-22, and *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 97; *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 26, 66, 86, 114, 120-22; "A Show of Force" and "Reviewing the Troops: How the Sides Measure Up," *Newsweek*, 20 August 1990, 22 and 25; "Major Military Units in the Persian Gulf Area," *New York Times*, 20 January 1991.
32. See *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1990* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1990), 402-4.
33. *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 97-98; and *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 42.
34. *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 42-43; and *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 99.
35. *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 98-99.
36. On the nature of the military forces of both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea in the early 1990s, see *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, 166-69.
37. *Ibid.*, 164-65.
38. *Ibid.*, 165-66.
39. *Ibid.*, 26.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Soviet Military Power 1989*, 117, and *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 99.
42. *Soviet Military Power 1990*, 99.
43. *Ibid.*

Chapter 6

Implications

FROM the foregoing analysis flow some implications for US military strategy and the structure of US military forces in the years ahead. Although this analysis does not suggest detailed guidelines for either, it does help to establish broad parameters for both.

Military Strategy

THE implications for military strategy can conveniently be broken down in terms of relevance to nonconventional and conventional issues.

Nonconventional Dimensions

Clearly, the US will require coherent approaches to nuclear, chemical, biological, and guerrilla warfare contingencies and to international terrorist actions. Moreover, these approaches should have certain specific features.

In the nuclear realm, the US will need to persist in seeking to ensure that it can withstand a strike by the Soviet Union against its continental territory and still deliver a devastating counterattack on the Soviet heartland, for despite the major political changes in progress in the Soviet Union, its capabilities to carry out such a strike will not disappear. US maintenance of a capacity to destroy the Soviet Union even after receiving a first strike may not afford great moral satisfaction, but no better alternative to preventing an all-out nuclear exchange will be available in the discernible future.

At the same time, the US should vigorously pursue arms control measures

designed to stabilize the US-Soviet strategic relationship as much as possible. Such measures should go beyond pushing for ratification and implementation of the recently concluded START Treaty. Although the US should do nothing to preclude the possibility of an agreement on additional mutual reductions of an across-the-board nature, such an accord may be out of the question; therefore, the US should focus on controlling or perhaps even eliminating the most destabilizing individual aspects of a post-START situation. Among the prime candidates might be the heavy missiles still allowed under the new START agreement and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV). The US should also press for new confidence building measures such as a commitment to open skies and increased on-site inspections.

As for potentially hostile nuclear powers aside from the Soviet Union, a somewhat different approach will prove essential. Soviet "new thinkers" on security matters concur with conservative Soviet military officers that any Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons or Soviet employment of nuclear weapons in a single theater would sooner or later lead to an intercontinental nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the US;¹ hence, US attempts to cope with potential or actual undertakings of these kinds outside the framework of efforts designed to prevent a global nuclear war appear to be idle exercises. This is not the case where other nuclear countries potentially

antagonistic toward the US are concerned. None of these states possesses the capability of inflicting catastrophic damage on the continental US, and none is likely to acquire such a capability any time soon. Yet they could conceivably do serious harm to US interests abroad, particularly to US citizens and facilities and to US allies.

In such instances, having the capacity to hit the territories of these countries with overwhelming nuclear force might not deter them from employing their weapons or induce them to cease using their weapons, for they might be skeptical that the US would unleash nuclear weapons against them as long as its own territory was not under attack. Consequently, the US must be prepared as well to retaliate quickly and decisively with conventional forces. Air elements would probably provide the most persuasive capabilities in this regard, but other types of units might also play a role.

Deploying defenses against missile delivery systems could serve as a further persuader; nonetheless, it would have some distinct drawbacks too. Setting up such defenses everywhere that a nuclear threat to US interests existed or might emerge could be astronomically expensive. Furthermore, these defenses would not absolutely guarantee deterrence, for the knowledge that at least a few nuclear-armed missiles might get through—as did some of the conventionally armed Scuds that Iraq fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia in early 1991—might convince a prospective aggressor that a first strike with such weapons had merit. If a first strike actually took place, of course, antimissile defenses could have considerable utility in limiting the consequences of that strike. Taken together, these considerations argue for, at most, selective deployment of antimissile defenses.

Arms control efforts, however, should definitely have a significant place in this

dimension of US strategy. Such undertakings would need to vary from one regional setting to another in accordance with which states already boast nuclear weapons and which states might be in the process of acquiring them. Thus far, Europe constitutes the only milieu in which regional security requirements have been addressed in a reasonably comprehensive fashion. In the wake of the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990–91, there appears to be some movement in this direction in the Middle East, but it is still much too early to tell for sure.²

Besides promoting regional accords that would limit stocks of nuclear weapons and/or curtail efforts already under way to acquire such weapons, the US should intensify its attempts to discourage states from embarking on programs to obtain nuclear weapons. In the aftermath of events in the Persian Gulf in 1990–91, the global political atmosphere seems to be conducive to increased international cooperation toward this end. The UN might offer an appropriate vehicle for such cooperation. Yet existing or new regional institutions might yield the best results. In any event, the US should be highly flexible and pragmatic in its choice of means through which to try to persuade countries to refrain from launching programs to acquire nuclear weapons.

To deal with the challenges posed by chemical and biological weapons, the US ought to champion arms control measures even more resolutely than in the case of nuclear weapons, for chemical and biological weapons are becoming attractive to a number of countries that do not have the means to develop or cannot afford nuclear weapons. In addition, the Soviet Union has already shown a willingness to move toward total destruction of its own stock of chemical weapons,³ and the heightened global awareness since the 1990–91 Persian Gulf conflict that

use of chemical and biological weapons in future wars is not unthinkable would undoubtedly facilitate efforts to outlaw them.

The UN might provide a suitable forum for a push to eliminate current stockpiles of such weapons and any facilities producing them, as well as to forestall their further spread. This is especially true in view of the UN Security Council's insistence in April 1991 that Iraq agree, as a condition for a permanent cease-fire in the Persian Gulf war, to dispose of its remaining chemical and biological assets under UN supervision.⁴ But the US should not overlook the option of working with regional organizations.

Eradication of chemical and biological weapons, of course, will not take place overnight. Until it comes about, the US will have no choice but to seek to deter their use and, if deterrence fails, to end their employment as rapidly as possible. The same general method of pursuing these goals should have validity for all countries, for the Soviet Union will not constitute a special case in this context. True, the Soviet Union does have the intercontinental ballistic missiles for long-range delivery of chemical or biological warheads to the continental US, yet it seems highly improbable that Soviet leaders would employ these missiles for such a mission. If they wanted to inflict enormous damage on the US heartland, they would almost certainly use the Soviet Union's intercontinental ballistic missiles to launch nuclear warheads because a chemical or biological attack on the continental US with these missiles would leave US forces with all of their nuclear weapons intact. Thus, the Soviet Union, like other countries, would no doubt target US interests overseas or, less likely, the continental US from relatively close range.

To prevent the employment of chemical and biological weapons or to put a quick stop to their use, the US would probably

need to retain limited numbers of such weapons for the time being, for any state seriously contemplating their employment might consider the total absence of a capability to retaliate in kind as a major weakness. However, possession of some of these weapons in all likelihood would not prove adequate. Much more critical might be the capacity of conventional US forces to conduct a swift and deadly strike (most probably by air, but not necessarily exclusively so) against any state that used such instruments. Obviously, attacking the Soviet Union and other large powers in this manner would pose greater difficulties for the US than would a strike against smaller countries, especially those in the third world. For example, the Soviet Union not only has strong conventional defenses but might decide to go nuclear if hit by US conventional forces. Nevertheless, the mere capability for the US to mount such a strike would give even the Soviet Union pause before it employed chemical or biological weapons.

Deploying antimissile defenses could also contribute to the advancement of these goals. But such a course would have similar drawbacks to those outlined above in regard to deterring or ending the employment of nuclear weapons. Therefore, deployment of defenses of this kind would appear feasible only in selected instances.

As for coping with threats posed by guerrilla warfare, the US, first of all, must exercise great care in deciding what rebellions require its engagement. Insurgencies may proliferate in the next decade or so, but many will have no bearing upon US security concerns, particularly if the Soviet Union refrains, as it has done in recent years, from attempting to exploit these as a means of enhancing its influence around the globe. Given the constraints on American resources, the US can ill afford to become involved in such situations. Involvements of this sort could jeopardize the US's ability to

respond to challenges that actually do affect its security.

Second, the US ought to rely on local governments to conduct the internal defense of their own countries. Furnishing advice, training, and perhaps even arms to local militaries may be essential, but the US should not assume responsibility for fighting in the field. In most instances, a local government will find social, economic, and political reforms imperative in addition to military measures to meet the insurgent challenge; and if the US takes on the task of protecting it militarily, that government may seek to avoid the hard steps required to guarantee resolution of the conflict. Moreover, if a government cannot help to ensure its own survival, then no amount of US military might will succeed in propping it up forever. In the meantime, the US could become a foreign oppressor in the eyes of large segments of the local population.

Third, the US should devote the major share of its resources to discouraging outside states from trying to fan rebellions for their own purposes. Despite the Soviet Union's new aversion to getting embroiled in insurgent situations, there are growing indications that many other countries will not prove so hesitant. A number of the significant regional powers appear especially prone to meddle in conflicts of this sort in their own areas. Stopping such activities will not be easy; minimizing them may sometimes be all that is possible. The accomplishment of either goal could necessitate the marshalling of substantial forces—especially air and/or naval assets—near the locale of the insurrection. It could even require punitive operations of one sort or another for especially flagrant interference.

In handling the challenge of international terrorist operations against US interests, the US should stress prior detection and deterrence. Such an approach would minimize damage and loss

of life. But it would also require the utmost cooperation and coordination between US military and civilian agencies and between these agencies and their counterparts abroad. Because of the diverse origins of known anti-American terrorist groups and the varied locales in which these groups function, the number of countries with which liaison would be essential could reach substantial proportions. In addition, efforts to keep sophisticated weapons out of the hands of anti-US terrorists could be vital to the approach's success.

Not all anti-American terrorist attacks, however, can be stopped before they take place; hence, the US would need to have available meaningful responses if deterrence failed. These responses should include vigorous efforts to track down the perpetrators of an incident, to recover any property seized, and to free any hostages or ensure their safety. Although reality suggests that these endeavors will sometimes fail, the certainty that the US will firmly pursue them and the possibility that they might work would serve as at least inhibitors of repeat terrorist actions. Furthermore, the US should seriously consider forceful retaliation when the opportunity presents itself. In some cases, who bears responsibility for an attack will be hard to determine, and even if the responsibility can be pinned down, there may be no viable targets for retaliation. Nevertheless, both criteria will be met on other occasions. In these instances, a military retaliation might accomplish a worthwhile purpose—especially if a terrorist act had state sponsorship.

Conventional Aspects

With respect to conventional military strategy, the US ought to plan on the possibility of having to fight two "half wars" simultaneously. One of these would be in the eastern Mediter-

ranean/Middle East, while the other would take place in East Asia/Southeast Asia. Not only does the potential for conflict run high in both areas, but the US has major interests in each. Thus, it would find remaining militarily disengaged from a war that broke out in either place exceedingly hard. Elsewhere, the US would not have the same difficulty, especially if it was already involved in military undertakings in another locale.

As long as the Soviet Union did not commit any of its conventional forces capable of functioning in these two areas to operations counter to those of the US, neither war would probably reach the magnitude of the 1991 Persian Gulf war against Iraq. (Saddam Hussein, after all, boasted the fourth largest army in the world at the outset of the 1991 fighting.) The one exception in this regard might be an attack by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Republic of Korea. Kim Il Sung's regime has a formidable military machine, and it enjoys an enormous geographic advantage in that Seoul, the heavily populated capital of the Republic of Korea, lies just a few miles south of the cease-fire line established in the early 1950s. Therefore, a lightning assault by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could give the Pyongyang forces a strategic position from which they could not be dislodged except by a massive military effort.

Should the Soviet Union opt to become engaged in a war in either area, however, the US could easily confront a conflict of substantial dimensions there. Although the Soviet Union has a limited capacity to function on its own in either area, its active support of a local, anti-American belligerent could prove quite unwelcome from a US standpoint.

The US should be prepared as well to reconstitute a major military force in Europe to meet a renewed Soviet buildup

there. Since the late 1980s, the Soviet Union has essentially lost its forward position in eastern Europe, and it has significantly reduced its own military forces relevant to the European theater. If it ultimately complies with the provisions of the CFE Treaty, its capabilities to undertake any offensive activities on the European front will decline even further. For the moment, though, the Soviet Union has simply moved a lot of the weapons and equipment that it once maintained west of the Urals to locations east of there, and despite the political and military upheavals that it has experienced since the abortive coup of August 1991, it still retains some capacity to reverse present trends and field a challenge of real consequence in Europe.

Yet the Soviet Union could not produce a threat of this nature instantaneously. Indeed, Soviet leaders might require as much as two years to rebuild their forces for such a purpose. Thus, the US would have considerable warning time to deal with the situation. Exactly how much time, it is true, might be debatable, for warning entails not just Soviet actions but also US perceptions of those actions. A lengthy period might pass after Soviet rearming began before the US realized what was happening. Therefore, the US might need to be able to put significant military forces back into Europe on much shorter notice than an optimistic estimate would suggest.

To meet the diffuse and widely dispersed conventional challenges that it could face, the US will have to forsake the notion of mounting forward defenses. It will simply lack the resources to implement such a concept. At most, the US will be able to maintain a forward military presence of varying size from place to place to signal its intention to counter any concrete armed threats that may arise there.

The US will need to compensate in two ways for the absence of foreign defenses. First, it must rely on local military forces to bear an increased share of the burden of handling local armed challenges—at least initially—until US reinforcements can arrive. Such reliance could require efforts to improve the training and the weapons and equipment of these forces. Second, to the extent possible, the US should pre-position in areas of particular interest to it arms that its forces would have to have for defensive operations there. This measure would facilitate rapid deployment of US forces in the event of a crisis.

Finally, global arms control undertakings in the conventional sphere will have less merit than those in the nonconventional domain, but the US ought to press hard for regional arms control agreements that would limit stockpiles or curtail the spread of the most destabilizing conventional weapons in specific areas. Ballistic missiles of an intermediate or medium range would probably be the prime candidates here; however, other items such as aircraft or tanks might be nearly as important in particular places.

Force Structure

OF THE implications for force structure, the most far-reaching concern conventional forces. Because speed of response will be essential to cope with the contingencies most likely to arise, the US military must have in active service conventional forces adequate to carry out sizable emergency deployments; moreover, these forces need to be sufficient to handle more than one deployment concurrently. Reserve elements could be designated as follow-on forces, especially if a crisis became prolonged. But the US response should not be dependent initially on the employment of

reserve units, even in a logistics support role.

At the same time, the organizational features of US conventional forces ought to be quite flexible. The milieus in which these forces will be called upon to operate will differ greatly, so there should be maximum flexibility to tailor to each specific situation the units dispatched to cope with it.

Generally speaking, US conventional combat forces should be highly mobile and capable of rapid maneuver. Not only will they probably have to reach their deployment destinations swiftly, but they may confront superior numbers when they get there, at least at the outset of any conflict.

To the extent that mobility and maneuverability are not compromised, these forces need to be outfitted with sophisticated weapons and equipment such as precision guided munitions. Items of this kind will help to offset the numerical imbalance that the forces may encounter at the beginning of a deployment.

The airlift and sealift components of conventional US forces must expand. With the total and size of US military contingents overseas inevitably destined to decrease, the US will have to transport across substantial distances many units that it will want to deploy to deal with particular crises, and adequate lift capabilities will be crucial to such endeavors. Airlift will have special importance wherever the arrival of forces in short order is imperative. Yet with current lift capabilities, the US would be hard put during a crisis, as the Persian Gulf deployment of 1990-91 showed, to move a large force to a faraway place in a timely fashion unless there was appreciable delay in the outbreak of actual fighting.⁵

The implications for the structure of nonconventional forces are less extensive than those for the structure of conven-

tional forces, but nonetheless of consequence. Plainly, the US needs to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. The Soviet Union is still sorting out its defense policy as well as its political arrangements after the attempted coup by conservatives in August 1991, but so far it has given no sign of altering its chartered course with respect to strategic nuclear weapons. That is, it apparently plans to retain a substantial number of heavy land-based missiles, to replace its older and lighter land-based missiles with mobile ones, to improve the hard-target kill capability of its submarine-launched missiles, and to enhance the quality of its bomber force. Thus, if the US does not take appropriate steps, the strategic balance could tilt in the Soviet Union's favor. Developing a proper response might require reconsideration of the US commitment to a balanced triad of forces, especially to the maintenance of a large component of land-based missiles. Increased availability and sophistication of air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, however, could render such a shift in approach palatable. Selective arms control measures such as limitations on mobile missiles and MIRVs could also prove helpful in this regard.

To handle nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capable of being delivered by intermediate-, medium-, or short-range missiles, the US military should have mobile antiballistic missile assets. It would probably deploy elements of this force only where the US had vital interests at stake or where the risk of an adversary employing such weapons was incontestably high. Nevertheless, assets of this sort ought to be available if needed.

As far as guerrilla warfare is concerned, some US military elements definitely ought to specialize in this type of combat. However, their training should focus primarily on how to counter

such warfare rather than on how to conduct it, for they will probably have far more occasion in the years ahead to use expertise of the former than of the latter type.

Last but not least, the US military needs dedicated forces to collect and disseminate relevant intelligence on anti-American terrorist groups as well as to react quickly to help deal with contingencies like the occupation of buildings or property and the taking of hostages by these groups. Such forces would not have to be enormous, but they should have these functions as their principal missions. Primary responsibility for such undertakings, of course, would remain with national civilian agencies; still, the military could play a highly meaningful role in the undertakings, particularly in responding to attacks.

Conclusion

THE preceding implications of the new configuration of threats to US security for the foreseeable future do not compel the US to abandon all of its prior thinking about military strategy and force structure. Some of these implications point up the need for continuity in key aspects of both. This need is most evident in the case of the US-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship.

Yet it is also quite clear that the US must revise its military strategy and force structure in major ways if it is to meet the security challenges that will confront it. Above all, increased reliance on allies and friends abroad and a reorganization and streamlining of US forces seem imperative. How effectively the US adjusts to the new realities facing it could greatly affect its ability to defend its own interests in the years ahead.

Notes

1. For a reflection of this viewpoint in the output of one of the most prominent civilian "new thinkers," see Aleksei Arbatov, "Military Doctrines," *Disarmament and Security 1987 Yearbook*, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow: Novosti, 1988), 204.

2. See, for instance, Alan Riding, "France Will Sign 1968 Nuclear Pact," *New York Times*, 4 June 1991.

3. At a summit meeting in May-June 1990, President Gorbachev and President Bush agreed to

cease production of chemical weapons, to slash sharply their stockpiles of these weapons, and to work toward a global ban on such weapons. See White House, "Summary of US-Soviet Agreement on Chemical Arms," *New York Times*, 2 June 1990.

4. Allen Cowell, "Baghdad Formally Agrees to 'Unjust' UN Conditions for Permanent Cease-Fire," *New York Times*, 7 April 1991.

5. For relevant discussion, see Bruce Vail and William DiBenedetto, "US Sealift Needs More Ships, War Showed," *Journal of Commerce*, 6 March 1991.

APPENDIX 1

Current Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces

A. Land-Based Ballistic Missiles

<i>Type Missile</i>	<i>Number*</i>		<i>Range (in km)</i>	<i>Reentry Vehicles per Missile</i>	<i>Total Reentry Vehicles*</i>	
	<i>(SMP)</i>	<i>(MB)</i>			<i>(SMP)</i>	<i>(MB)</i>
SS-25	270	225	10,500	1	270	225
SS-24	80	60	10,000	10	800	600
SS-19	300	320	10,000	6	1,800	1,920
SS-18	308	308	11,000	1 (Models 1/3/6) 10 (Models 4/5)	3,080	3,080
SS-17	70	75	10,000	4	280	300
SS-13	40	60	9,400	1	40	60
SS-11	335	350	10,600	1 (Model 2) 3 (Model 3)	1,005	1,050
Totals	1,403	1,398			7,275	7,235

* *Soviet Military Power 1990* and *The Military Balance 1990-1991* give different figures for the total number of missiles and the breakdown of this sum by type. These differences account for the conflicting figures for reentry vehicles.

B. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

<i>Type Missile</i>	<i>Missiles per Platform</i>	<i>Total Platforms</i>	<i>Total Missiles</i>	<i>Missile Range</i>	<i>Reentry Vehicles per Missile</i>	<i>Total Reentry Vehicles</i>
SS-N-23	16	6 Delta IVs	96	9,000	Up to 10	960
SS-N-20	20	6 Typhoons	120	8,300	10	1,200
SS-N-18	16	14 Delta IIIs	224	6,500	3 (Model 1) 7 (Model 3)	1,568
SS-N-17	12	1 Yankee II	12	3,700	1	12
SS-N-8	16	4 Delta IIs	64	9,100	1	64
	12	18 Delta Is	216	—	—	216
SS-N-6	16	12 Yankee Is	192	3,000	1	192
SS-N-5	3	2 Golf IIs	6	1,400	1	6
Totals		63	930			4,218

C. Strike Aircraft

<i>Type</i>	<i>Total Number</i>	<i>Unrefueled Combat Radius (in km)</i>	<i>Payload per Aircraft</i>	<i>Total Weapons (with Cruise Missiles Maximized)</i>	<i>Cruise Missiles Ranges (in km)</i>
Tu-160					
Blackjack	15	7,300	12 AS-15s	180	1,600
Tu-95 Bear	160	6,400			
H	75		Up to 8 AS-15s	600	1,600
B-G	60		4 bombs and	240	
			2 AS-3s or	120	500
			2 AS-4s		300
A-B	25		4 bombs	100	
Totals	175			1,240	

Sources: Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1990), chap. 5; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's, Autumn 1990), 34 and 221-23.

Legend: SMP—Soviet Military Power
 MB—Military Balance
 km—kilometers

APPENDIX 2

Current US Strategic Nuclear Forces

A. Land-Based Ballistic Missiles

<i>Missile</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Range (in km)</i>	<i>Reentry Vehicles per Missile</i>	<i>Total Reentry Vehicles</i>
Peacekeeper	50	11,000+	Up to 10	500
Minuteman III	500	11,000+	3	1,500
Minuteman II	450	12,500	1	450
Totals	1,000			2,450

B. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

<i>Type Missile</i>	<i>Missiles per Platform</i>	<i>Total Platforms</i>	<i>Total Missiles</i>	<i>Missile Range (in km)¹</i>	<i>Reentry Vehicles per Missile</i>	<i>Total Reentry Vehicles</i>
Trident D-5	24	2 SSBN-726 (Ohio)	48	7,400	8	384
Trident C-4			384	7,400	8	3,072
	24	8 SSBN-726 (Ohio)	192			
	16	6 SSBN-640 (Franklin)	96			
	16	6 SSBN-627 (Madison)	96			
Poseidon C-3			192	4,000	10	1,920
	16	6 SSBN-640 (Franklin)	96			
	16	2 SSBN-627 (Madison)	32			
	16	4 SSBN-616 (Lafayette)	64			
Totals	34		624			5,376

C. Strike Aircraft

<i>Type</i>	<i>Total Number</i>		<i>Unrefueled Combat Radius</i>	<i>Payload per Aircraft</i>	<i>Total Weapons (with Cruise Missiles Maximized)</i>	<i>Cruise Missiles Ranges</i>
	<i>(Active)</i>	<i>(Storage)</i>	<i>(in km)</i>			<i>(in km)</i>
B-1B	90	5	7,500	Internal: 24 SRAMs* or 24 bombs External: 14 SRAMs or 14 bombs	3,610	220
B-52H	84	11	8,000	Internal: 8 ALCMs** External: 12 ALCMs	1,900	2,400
B-52G***	70	7	7,500	Internal: 8 SRAMs or 12 bombs External: 12 ALCMs	1,540	
Totals	244	23			7,050	

*Short-range attack missile.

**Air-launched cruise missile.

***Only those employed in a strategic role. There are an additional 33 active aircraft and six in storage that are assigned a conventional role.

Sources: Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1990* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1990), chap. 5; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's, Autumn 1990), 17, 216-18.

APPENDIX 3

Current International Terrorist Organizations

<i>Group</i>	<i>Date Formed</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Roots</i>	<i>Recent Anti-United States Activities</i>
1. Abu Nidal Organization (also known as Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims)	1974	Palestinian liberation	Palestine	Yes
2. Al-Fatah (also known as Al 'Asifa)	1957	Palestinian liberation	Palestine	Yes
3. Hawari Group (also known as Fatah Special Operations Group, Martyrs of Tal Al Za'atar, Amn Araissi)	?	Palestinian liberation	Palestine	Yes
4. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	1969	Palestinian liberation and Marxist	Palestine	No
5. 15 May Organization	1979	Palestinian liberation	Palestine	Yes
6. Force 17	Early 1970s	Palestinian liberation	Palestine	No
7. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	1977	Palestinian liberation	Palestine	Yes
8. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	1964	Palestinian liberation	Palestine	No
9. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	1967	Palestinian liberation and Marxist-Leninist	Palestine	No

<i>Group</i>	<i>Date Formed</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Roots</i>	<i>Recent Anti-United States Activities</i>
10. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC)	1968	Palestinian liberation	Palestine	Yes
11. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—Special Command (PFLP-SC)	1979	Palestinian liberation and Marxist-Leninist	Palestine	Yes
12. Popular Struggle Front (PSF)	1967	Palestinian liberation	Palestine	No
13. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (also known as Islamic Jihad—Jerusalem)	?	Palestinian liberation and Islamic fundamentalist	Palestine	No
14. Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)	1979	Pro-Palestinian and Marxist-Leninist	Lebanon	Yes
15. Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (also known as The Orly Group, 3rd October)	1975	Armenian liberation and Marxist-Leninist	Armenia (Turkey)	Yes
16. Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (also known as Armenian Revolutionary Army)	1975	Armenian liberation and right-wing	Armenia (Turkey)	No
17. Hizballah or Party of God (also known as Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization)	1983	Islamic fundamentalist and pro-Iranian	Lebanon	Yes
18. Armed Liberation Forces Zarate Willka (FAL)	1987	Leftist	Bolivia	Yes
19. Central American Revolutionary Worker's Party (PRTC)	1976	Regional Marxist-Leninist	Central America (El Salvador group the most important)	Yes
20. Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (CERF)	1983	Leftist	El Salvador	Yes

<i>Group</i>	<i>Date Formed</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Roots</i>	<i>Recent Anti-United States Activities</i>
21. Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)*	1980	Coalition of five Marxist and Marxist-Leninist groups	El Salvador	Yes
22. Lautaro Youth Movement (also known as Lautaro faction of United Popular Action Movement or Lautaro Popular Rebel Forces)	Late 1980s	Leftist	Chile	Yes
23. Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)	1983	Marxist-Leninist	Chile	Yes
24. Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)	1965	Marxist-Leninist	Chile	No
25. Morazanist Patriotic Front (FPM)	Late 1980s	Leftist	Honduras	Yes
26. Popular Revolutionary Forces—Lorenzo Zelaya (FRP-LZ)	1978	Leftist	Honduras	Yes
27. Movement of April 19 (M19)**	1974	Leftist	Colombia	Yes
28. National Liberation Army (ELN)	1963	Marxist-Leninist and pro-Cuban	Colombia	Yes
29. People's Liberation Army (EPL)***	1967	Marxist-Leninist (Maoist)	Colombia	Yes
30. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	1966	Marxist-Leninist	Colombia	Yes
31. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)	1969	Marxist-Leninist (Maoist)	Peru	Yes
32. Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)	1983	Marxist-Leninist	Peru	Yes
33. Action Directe (AD)	1979	Marxist	France	Yes
34. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETAM)	1959	Basque separatist	Spain	No

<i>Group</i>	<i>Date Formed</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Roots</i>	<i>Recent Anti-United States Activities</i>
35. October 1st Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)	1975	Marxist-Leninist (Maoist)	Spain	Yes
36. Red Army for the Liberation of Catalonia (ERCA)	By 1987	Catalonian separatist and Marxist-Leninist	Spain	Yes
37. Terra Lliure (Free Land)	1970s	Catalonian separatist and Marxist	Spain	No
38. Communist Combatant Cells (CCC)	1984	Marxist-Leninist	Belgium	Yes
39. Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25)	1980	Marxist	Portugal	Yes
40. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)	1969	Irish unification and Marxist	Ireland	No
41. Red Army Faction (RAF)	1968	Marxist-Leninist	Germany	Yes
42. Red Brigades (BR)	1969	Marxist-Leninist	Italy	Yes
43. Revolutionary Organization 17 November (also known as 17 November)	1975	Marxist	Greece	Yes
44. Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)	1971	Leftist	Greece	Yes
45. Kurdish Worker's Party (also known as Kurdish Labor Party)	Mid-1970s	Kurdish separatist and Marxist-Leninist	Turkey	No
46. Chukaku-Ha (Nucleus or Middle-Core Faction)	1963	"New Leftist"	Japan	Yes
47. Japanese Red Army (JRA)	1971	Marxist-Leninist	Japan	Yes
48. New People's Army (NPA)	1969	Marxist-Leninist (Maoist)	Philippines	Yes
49. Dashmesh (also known as 10th Regiment)	Around 1982	Sikh separatist	India	No

<i>Group</i>	<i>Date Formed</i>	<i>Type</i>	<i>Roots</i>	<i>Recent Anti-United States Activities</i>
50. Dal Khalsa	1978	Sikh separatist	India	No
51. Babbar Khalsa	?	Sikh separatist	India	No
52. All-India Sikh Students Federation	?	Sikh separatist	India	No
53. African National Congress (ANC)****	1961 (guerrilla wing formed)	Black rights	South Africa	No
54. National Resistance Movement (RENAMO)	1976	Rightist	Mozambique	No

*In early 1991, the FMLN appeared to be edging toward a renunciation of terrorism as a means of pursuing its political ends. The senior commander of the group's military forces, Joaquin Villalobos, asserted that his group could no longer be considered a Marxist movement, and he indicated that its goals would not be achieved by an armed revolution but through participation in an unarmed political movement in a pluralistic, competitive democracy. In accordance with this position, the front did not seek to interfere with voting in the Salvadoran municipal and legislative elections in March 1991. See Mark Uhlig, "Salvador Guerrillas Pledge Not to Disrupt Next Election," *New York Times*, 2 March 1991, and "Top Salvador Rebel Alters His Goals," *New York Times*, 7 March 1991; Shirley Christian, "Salvador Chief Sees Better Chance for Peace," *New York Times*, 10 March 1991.

**M19 forsook terrorist activities and participated in the 1990 national elections in Colombia. See "What Happened to Guerrilla Bands," and James Brooke, "Colombian Guerrillas Forsake the Gun for Politics," *New York Times*, 2 September 1990.

***The EPL formally laid down its arms and returned to civilian life in early 1991. See "More Rebels in Colombia Lay Down Their Arms," *New York Times*, 27 January 1991; and "Colombia Rebel Group Quits After 23 Yrs," *New York Times*, 2 March 1991.

* **In August 1990, the ANC agreed to suspend its guerrilla war in return for a number of concessions from the South African government, and then in February 1991 it reached an accord with the authorities in Pretoria to stop both infiltration and training of guerrillas and not to threaten violence as long as the government recognized its right to carry on peaceful protest activities. See Alan Cowell, "African National Congress Suspends Its Guerrilla War," *New York Times*, 7 August 1990, and "Communist Ally of Mandela Says Rebel War Could Still Be Revived," *New York Times*, 8 August 1990; Christopher S. Wren, "In South Africa, Key Accord on Fighters," *New York Times*, 16 February 1991.

Sources: Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1990), 55-85; *Terrorist Group Profiles* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 1988), passim.